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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

'AL-HAWADITH' INTERVIEWS FATAH'S ABU JIHAD

PM201221 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 21 May 82 pp 21-22

[Interview with Fatah Central Committee member and Deputy Commander in Chief of Fatah's al-'Asifah forces Khalil al-Wazir--also identified by His Nom De Guerre Abu Jihad--by Farid al-Khatib: "Abu Jihad Tells AL-HAWADITH: Our Military Answer Had Political Dimensions"--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] AL-HAWADITH: Are decisions regarding the ceasefire related to an Arab strategy?

Abu Jihad: As you know, there is actually no comprehensive Arab strategy. The Arab situation is bad and is characterized by division. The position here is that:

1. We should be prepared to face any possible Israeli aggression, depending on the intrinsic capabilities and resources of the Palestinian forces and the "joint forces" before anything else.
2. Under the present circumstances we do not expect large-scale Arab action against aggression. We are confident, however, that our Syrian brothers, as they have always stressed, will be with us in offering confrontation and shouldering the responsibilities of confronting the Israeli aggressions on the basis of an assessment of the resulting situation.

AL-HAWADITH: Will there be consultations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait before a decision is made regarding the question of the ceasefire, bearing in mind that Saudi Arabia helped promote the ceasefire?

Abu Jihad: The issue of the ceasefire is quite clear. When the Israeli enemy violates the ceasefire, the issues related to confronting the enemy should not be held up. We must not waste time. We have to take the necessary steps to prevent the Israeli enemy from carrying out a military operation, as usual, while we are still discussing whether or not to retaliate. We are the masters of our decisions and we make them on the basis of the forces and circumstances in the Lebanese arena and in consultation with our brothers in the movement and the Lebanese nationalist forces. These are the factors which determine our decision about the level and method of retaliation.

AL-HAWADITH: Is it possible to build politically on the ceasefire agreement, in the interest of progress toward peace in the region?

Abu Jihad: We should place the issue of the ceasefire in southern Lebanon in its limited perspective. We must not go any further than that. Each side has an interest in adhering to the ceasefire. As for the possibility of linking this matter to any international political trends, we must realize that the general international political situation does not at present inspire any movement or inclination toward any wider political steps. This is naturally due to the present state of world affairs and U.S. policy, which avoids anything that might contribute to a recognition of the Palestinian people's right to an independent national state. It is also due to Europe's retreat, under U.S. pressure, from any possibility of playing an active political role. The weakness of the Arab position and the Arab divisions do not encourage international political moves toward anything.

AL-HAWADITH: I have a question about the resistance's retaliation to the latest Israeli aggression, namely the shelling of Israeli settlements in upper Galilee. Some observers have described this retaliation as a "political response" because the shells and rockets fell on uninhabited areas and did not result in any casualties or material damage. What is your opinion?

Laughing, 'Arafat's military deputy said: Our decision to retaliate the second time was adequate for that particular Israeli operation and it did have a political dimension, as follows:

1. The joint forces have not hesitated to retaliate to any Israeli military operation or aggression so that the fighters in the joint forces will not forget that they always have the initiative.
2. We took into consideration what is happening within the Israeli community--government and people--and the nature of the retaliation carried a meaning to every Israeli.
3. We have been observing the attitude of the inhabitants of the northern settlements who have confronted the prime minister, the defense minister and the chief of staff. They rejected the claim that the discovery of some old mines justified a military operation. They stressed that the continuation of the ceasefire was in their interests.
4. As far as the international aspect is concerned, we have been eager to emphasize that we make our own decisions, that we take into consideration the Israeli scene, and that we will continue to confront any aggression with all the means at our disposal.

AL-HAWADITH: The Israeli chief of staff has been raising doubts about the ceasefire. What is your comment?

Abu Jihad: We have frequently stressed that we are not interested in violating the ceasefire, but at the same time it is our right to continue the struggle in the ways we deem fit and across other borders and fronts, and this includes the struggle of our revolutionary people in the occupied territory. The repeated Israeli threats will not make us change our convictions or methods. If they consider this to be a violation of the ceasefire, so be it. We will just have to face the Israeli policy of aggression with all our resources and capabilities. We are confident that the Palestinian revolution's forces and the joint forces will, in their own special ways, make the enemy pay a very high price.

AL-HAWADITH: U.S. Secretary of State Haig recently said: "We have indirectly been trying to understand the Palestinian views and attitudes in southern Lebanon." Does this statement indicate a new U.S. position on the Palestine question?

Abu Jihad: We do not see anything new in the U.S. policy toward the Palestinian people and rights. On the contrary, every day the United States goes one step further in its support for the Israeli policy of aggression against the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian people in the occupied territory.

AL-HAWADITH: Does the statement by official U.S. State Department spokesman Dean Fischer, in which he said "we welcome the PLO's announcement" that it intends to respect and adhere to the ceasefire in the south, mean anything new?

Abu Jihad: There is nothing new. We have explained the position of the Palestinian revolution. This position is based on certain considerations and joint studies with the Lebanese forces, and, above all, on the interests of this region. All the international circles are aware of our clear position. It is always our aim to expose to everyone the nature of the continuous Israeli aggression supported by the United States.

AL-HAWADITH: Is it true that the Soviet Union has stopped putting pressure on its friends in Lebanon to preserve the ceasefire?

Abu Jihad: The Soviet Union has not exerted pressure for or against the ceasefire, because the decision rests with the people concerned here. However, when there are discussions regarding issues related to the ceasefire, we hold consultations on them with our friends, including the Soviet Union, and with a large number of Arab states, including the steadfastness and confrontation front states. We always hold consultations with all these states on current developments and future possibilities and we brief them on our position on all developments.

CSO: 4400/271

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

HIGHER COUNCIL MEETS ON WEST BANK, GAZA

NC190846 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 0645 GMT 19 May 82

[Text] The Higher Council for the Affairs of the Occupied Homeland met yesterday at the behest of the PLO Executive Committee. The meeting was held to discuss and study the developments of the situation in the occupied territories from all its perspectives.

Brother Hamid Abu Sittah, [PLO] Executive Committee member, made a statement after the meeting in which he said: The council has discussed the situation in the occupied homeland and has made the decisions ensuring the boosting of our people's uprising in the occupied areas and the backing of the municipal councils and all the patriotic establishments.

The council has emphasized its full support for the continuation by the Municipal Council of their boycott of the civil administration and of the suspension of their work until the occupation authorities submit to the demands [mataalib] of the municipal councils that the civil administration be canceled and until the occupation authorities rescind the decisions to dissolve the al-Birah Municipality and to force Brothers al-Shak'ah, Khalaf, al-Tawil and al-Handallah to resign.

The council also greeted all the segments of our people and their national institutions, which are challenging and facing all the measures being taken by the occupation authorities for the purpose of imposing the civil administration as a prelude to imposing the projected liquidator autonomy and annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

We are confident that our heroic people in the occupied territories will bury the civil administration, just as they have interred the so-called village leagues. We are also confident that our people will continue to rally round their leadership--the PLO--and that they will maintain the struggle until liberation and victory.

CSO: 4400/271

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

'ARAFAT CONGRATULATES EGYPT'S MUHYI AL-DIN--Yasir 'Arafat has sent a cable to the Egyptian National Grouping Party's head Khalid Muhyi al-Din, head of the opposition party, exiled during al-Sadat's rule congratulating him on his return to Egypt. 'Arafat stated his confidence that the Egyptian party will continue along the same line as the vanguard of the Egyptian Arab struggle. [Text] [JN191542 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in English 1500 GMT 19 May 82]

'ARAFAT HAILS EGYPTIAN PAPER'S RETURN--Brother Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] has sent a congratulatory message to Khalid Muhyi al-Din, secretary general of the Egyptian National Progressive Union Group, as well as to the editorial staff of the AL-AHALI newspaper on the occasion of the paper's reappearance. In his message Abu 'Ammar says: In these critical circumstances through which the Arab nation, particularly the Palestinian revolution, is passing and at a time when the Zionist enemy is amassing his aggressive forces and the modern U.S. war machinery in southern Lebanon against our Palestinian and Lebanese peoples, we could not but look forward with confidence and hope to the reappearance of our struggling newspaper AL-AHALI as a weapon added to the arms of the Arab liberation and progressive forces in our fateful battle against our enemies. The brother commander in chief concluded his message by saying: The group and the newspaper AL-AHALI have adopted principled stands alongside the Palestinian right. We are confident that AL-AHALI will proceed along the same line that you have drawn up for leading the Egyptian-Arab struggle. [Text] [NCI91208 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1115 GMT 19 May 82]

CSO: 4400/271

AID TO AFRICAN STATES OUTLINED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 18, 3 May 82 pp 6-7

[Text] The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) made concessional loans to African countries totalling \$76 million in 1981, compared to \$66 million the previous year. BADEA has committed a total of \$674 million to African states since its creation in 1975, of which \$460 million was in loans and \$214 million in project co-financing.

BADEA contributed to co-financing operations worth a total of \$780 million, supplying 36.4 per cent of the funds. Its partners in the co-financing deals were other Arab development funds and the OPEC Fund for International Development.

BADEA has contributed 10 per cent of total Arab aid to Africa, which amounted to \$6.669 billion in the last five years, an Arab League official announced recently. The Assistant Arab League Secretary General for International Relations, Adnan Amran, said that the aid was distributed as follows: \$3.817 billion to West Africa, \$2.468 billion to East Africa, and \$308 million divided among various regional organisations.

In a related development, the Director General of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), Faisal al-Khaled, announced that KFAED would maintain its level of aid to developing countries in spite of the fall in Kuwait's oil revenues. In an interview with the Beirut-based magazine *Al-Iqtisad al-Arabi*, Mr Khaled said that KFAED would not be affected by fluctuations in government income since it depended on loan reimbursements and well-invested deposits. He warned, however, that the Kuwaiti government's plans to allocate funds to KFAED might be delayed by current oil market conditions.

CSO: 4400/274

**ADF VOTES TO DOUBLE CAPITAL**

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 18, 3 May 82 p 6

[Text] The Board of Governors of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) last week voted to double the Fund's capital to KD 800 million (\$2.8 billion). Meeting in Kuwait, the Governors also approved the appointment of the Fund to act as the general secretariat for the first Arab Development Decade, a \$5 billion aid programme to help poor Arab countries. The Decade is being financed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Iraq and Qatar.

The Governors also approved a report on the Fund's activities and finances in 1981 and elected the representative of Algiers as the new Chairman of the Board. The Governors are to meet next in Algiers in April 1983.

According to AFESD board member and Tunisian Minister of Finance Mansour Muall, the volume of development investments in the Arab world amounted to \$983 billion during the 1976-80 period, compared to \$189 billion during 1971-75. Mr Muall said that the Arab world achieved a growth rate of 7 per cent at fixed prices over the past decade. In 1981 AFESD issued loans totalling \$189 million to 15 Arab countries, and lending by the fund this year will total \$267 million, AFESD President Mohammed Imadi of Syria told last week's meeting.

The approved increase in the fund's capital is to be paid up in four annual installments, beginning in February 1983.

The ministers of the five Arab oil exporting countries financing the Arab Development Decade also met in Kuwait last week to discuss projects worth \$543 million proposed by AFESD for funding by the Decade. But the meeting ended without producing a final agreement to finance any of the projects, and the ministers agreed only to continue studying them. The last meeting of the Decade in November ended in approval of projects for an Arab satellite network and agricultural programmes.

CSO: 4400/274

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

EXPORT MARKETS--Too many new Arab industries are intended to produce goods for foreign markets and ignore the potential markets of the Arab world, according to Secretary General of the Arab Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry Dr Bourhan Dijani. Speaking at four-day symposium on promoting Arab exports held last week in Abu Dhabi, Dr Dijani said that joint venture projects among Arab countries should be set up in order to "secure a lasting foothold for Arab output in Arab markets." Furthermore, such joint investment projects will be required if the Arab world is to attain self-sufficiency in food, a goal often espoused by Arab development planners. To make his point Dr Dijani cited Arab imports of 1 million trucks each year. Despite such high demand, no serious effort has been made to set up an Arab joint venture to manufacture trucks, he stated. Other participants at the Abu Dhabi symposium pointed out the potential advantages of integrating capital and manpower resources in the Arab world and of improving inter-Arab transportation and communication facilities. According to Deputy Director of the Arab League's Economic Affairs Department Abdul Razaq Hassan, the respective economic development programmes of each Arab country are hampered by lack of coordination with the programmes of other Arab countries. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 19, 10 May 82 p 5]

UAE, MOROCCAN JOINT VENTURES--The UAE and Morocco are to set up a joint company to finance projects in both countries and have agreed to exchange information and expertise to improve their managerial techniques, it was announced in Abu Dhabi last week following a visit to the Emirates by Moroccan Prime Minister Maati Bouabid. Nasser al-Nowais, Managing Director of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADFAED) said he would go to Morocco in June to sign an agreement establishing the joint company. ADFAED has already granted Morocco three loans for a total of \$41 million to finance agricultural and industrial projects, Mr Nowais said. Meanwhile, UAE Minister for Cabinet Affairs Saeed al-Ghayth said the management development institutes of both countries have agreed on an exchange scheme and that UAE citizens would be offered scholarships to train in Morocco. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 19, 10 May 82 p 5]

CSO: 4400/274

PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

OIL PRODUCT PRICE UNIFICATION--Oil ministers of the six nations belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council have recommended a unified pricing system for refined oil products and studies to establish a single pricing system are to be undertaken by the managers of the national oil companies of the member states, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani announced last week. He was speaking after a meeting of GCC oil ministers in Riyadh and he said the ministers had adopted a certain number of unspecified recommendations concerning petroleum products and their production and consumption in GCC states. "The meeting, among other things, discussed coordination and cooperation among GCC member states in the local marketing and refining industries," Sheikh Yamani declared. He did not give details. The Gulf Cooperation Council brings together Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 18, 3 May 82 p 10]

CSO: 4400/274

AFGHANISTAN

SOVIET GAINS, LOSSES IN AFGHAN WAR REVIEWED

Paris ESPRIT in French Apr 82 pp 71-79

[Article by Jean-Jose Puig: "Soviet Engagement." Introduction by Gerard Chaliand]

[Text] By its scale and its length, the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation is an unexpected act of defiance. Various factors account for it: a pre-existing active opposition to the Khalq policy itself due to many reasons (social and cultural conservatism, opposition to interference by the central government, ethnic and religious problems, errors of the new regime), a warlike tradition feeding on the awareness of having never been enslaved, and the poverty of the country. It is indeed easier to lead a guerrilla under the economic conditions prevailing in Yugoslavia or Greece, than under those of France during World War II.

Another essential factor--although little noticed--is demographic: approximately 60 percent of the Afghans are under 30. As a result, their psychological relationship to war and violence in general is entirely different.

At present, the Afghan resistance is still in its ascending phase. The political necessity for the Soviets not to have to increase considerably the number of their troops works in favor of the Afghan combatants who are widely supported by the population. Conditions for a protracted struggle exist in Afghanistan. Indeed, civilian society is under no control, as J. J. Puig notices, and--in the absence of nationalism, still in an embryonic state--Islam supplies an ideology of resistance, a much more common phenomenon than is generally assumed, as explained by Olivier Roy.

In spite of the many refugees who are now in Pakistan, and in spite of the bombings, the war in Afghanistan is still not as deadly as other colonial wars (Vietnam, Algeria), but it is doubtful that this situation can continue several more years, especially if, as is the case today, the resist-

ance receives increased arms and organizational reinforcements. We have good grounds to fear that, in order to eliminate the Afghan abscess quickly, the Soviet may some day make massive use of chemical weapons.

A consideration of the international and Afghan situation on the eve of the April 1978 coup, and an analysis of the ups and downs of the Afghan government since then, enable us to make a few tentative assumptions concerning the premeditation of the coup. Indeed, we have every reason to assume that the taking over of power originated in the ambition and impatience of a few Afghan nationalists claiming to be communists. The style of the new government is the result of an uncontrolled revolutionary dynamism poorly adapted to Afghan conditions. As for the persistency of the crisis and of the guerrilla, it would be due:

- to the vacuity of the seat of institutional power (inconsistency of the government);
- to the ability of the Afghan populations to negate (or ignore) the legitimacy of this government;
- to the antagonism existing between the rural and the urban worlds;
- to the underestimation, by the Soviets, of the historical Afghan heritage and to their wrong evaluation of the consequences of an intervention.

As far as the international significance of the Afghan question is concerned, we can say that:

- the present occupation of Afghanistan is essentially due to the fact that it has a border in common with the Soviet Union;
- the conditions for a solution (timing and types of solution) are essentially dependent on the evolution of East-West relations;
- these conditions will determine the evolution of North-South relations or, more precisely, demand a redefinition of the concept of non-alignment.

To give some substance to these assumptions, we must relate the succession of events, and then try and answer the obvious questions to which it gives rise.

On 22 April 1978, the funeral of parchami Khyber gave rise to a demonstration of opponents to the Kabul regime. The leaders, among whom Noor Mohamed Taraki, Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin, were arrested. Amin was the only one who, thanks to his connivance with the police, could obtain a night's reprieve.

On 27 April, while the fate of the imprisoned leaders was being decided, tanks encircled the ministry of the Interior and the presidential palace. Early in the afternoon, after an unsuccessful assault by the tanks, the palace was bombarded by aircraft coming from Bagram (a large airbase north of Kabul) and piloted by insurgent officers under the command of Abdel Qader. In the evening, Daoud's personal guard was crushed and he and most members of his family were assassinated.

The next day, the leaders were freed and carried in triumph through Kabul. On 30 April, the military handed over the power to the civilian authorities. Noor Mohamed Taraki became president of the Republic.

The regime was immediately recognized by the USSR; its first public statements were totally ambiguous. Following a few hasty demagogical measures (like free bread in Kabul), wide-ranging reforms were announced. Very soon, the two wings of the PDPA [expansion unknown], Khalq and Parcham, began to tear each other apart in a struggle for power. The Khalq won and started a great witches hunt (summer 1978). At the same time, uprisings began in the country (Waigal, Nuristan, July 1978). The implementation of the land reform and of the alphabetization campaign met with increasing resistance from the people, taking specific forms in each region. The revolt spread to the heart of Nuristan and toward Badakhshan. The new regime purged the administration and increased police repression in the cities. The army intervened to try and repress the popular uprisings, thereby causing the first wave of emigration (Kamdesh, August 1978).

After a sort of winter truce, the revolt spread to the northeast of the country, then to the west following the tragic events of Herat (March 1979) when tens of thousands of people are said to have found death. The center of the country (Hazaradjat) then also rebelled (April 1979) and got rid of the government representatives. The tribal regions only remained somewhat neutral, but the number of desertions from the Afghan army started to increase and the administration was no longer working. Indeed, most competent cadres had been either imprisoned or killed or had left the country. They had been replaced by young, arrogant and incompetent ideologues. The rise of Hafizullah Amin, an ambitious and brutal character, was marked by an increase in police terror and an intensification of the repression of uprisings. Little by little, the tribes rebelled, like the Paktya during the summer of 1979. Attempted plots and uprisings in the Afghan army were severely repressed (Bala-Issar, August 1979). The cities were increasingly unsafe (massacre of the Hazaras, August 1979).

In September 1979, on his way back from Havana, Taraki was welcomed in Moscow and was given the advice to conclude a new alliance with the Parcham after getting rid of Hafizullah Amin. The latter, informed of the fate reserved for him, took the initiative and eliminated Taraki. The USSR then saw itself obliged to recognize the new leader, but it started concentrating troops on the north shore of the Amu-Darya. Amin then derided the USSR by asking for the recall of Ambassador Puzanov, the author of the quiet coup of 1973\* and the organizer of that of 1978. In addition, Amin contested the Soviet's right to use the Shindand base, in the southwest of Afghanistan, not far from the Iranian border. Most of the country was then in open rebellion and the large fall 1979 offensives in the northeast, the east and the southeast of Afghanistan caused a massive flow of refugees toward Pakistan.

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\* Replacement of King Zaher Shah by his cousin Daoud. Proclamation of the Republic. Although the new regime did not represent a considerable social change, it submitted more readily to Soviet influence. The change was from a pro-occidental to a pro-sovietic "non-alignment."

Toward the end of December 1979, Soviet troops entered in Afghanistan, eliminated Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal at the head of the state, now in complete distress. After a short respite in police terror, the intestine struggles between Khalq and Parcham started again worse than ever and the army, the majority of the cadres of which were khalqi, became increasingly unreliable. Massive desertions were on the increase. The flow of refugees was increasing every day and the Soviet army was trying to gain control of the country.

Early in spring 1980, the USSR was forced to withdraw all of its muslim troops, who sympathized too much with the Afghan insurgents. These troops were replaced by non-Russian troops, essentially Baltic and Ukrainian. Little by little, the resistance was getting organized, the political parties in exile were extending their influence inside Afghanistan and, in spite of large-scale operations, the Soviet army could not control more than 10 percent of the territory, essentially the cities and the main highways.

Two years after the Soviet intervention, the situation in Afghanistan has still not returned to normal, the internal struggles of Afghan communists are still undermining the government, all the organs of which are under Soviet control; the afflicted populations of the east continue to take refuge in Pakistan, those of the west in Iran, and Islamic fundamentalism finds itself considerably strengthened to the detriment of the nationalists, whether conservative (kahns and maliks in the tribes compromised with the previous regimes) or modernist (accultured urban classes).

This rapid review of the best known events amounts to an acknowledgement of failure. Nevertheless, it gives rise to a number of questions:

- Was it in the USSR's best interest to make a communist state out of Afghanistan?
- Who took the initiative of giving this country revolutionary impetus?
- Were those who took this risk ready to exert power?
- Was Afghanistan ripe to become a new socialist country?

To answer the first question, we must consider the situation in Afghanistan before the coup.

The USSR had already gained control of the only organ of the Afghan government that had any substance, i.e. the army. Indeed, since 1953, the USSR had been supplying equipment to the army and training its cadres. In addition, most cadres were communists, mostly with khalqi leanings.

The USSR had also little difficulty in imposing its economic decisions. The five-year plan was prepared by Soviet advisors and the major options were defined only in terms of Soviet interests, whether in prospecting for minerals, in exploiting gas and oil resources, in developing catchment basins to create the infrastructure for a heavy industry (production of electricity), or in redefining irrigation networks so as to promote cotton as a single crop at the expense of food crops.

Most of the foreign trade was also in the hands of the Soviet, Afghanistan being dependent on imports of refined products, sugar, fertilizers and agricultural equipment.

Politically, the Daoud government enjoyed a certain internal freedom, especially so because most Afghan had no political awareness. Only those living in the cities, especially students, had become interested in politics since the early 1960's, and Kabul had known a rather marked agitation toward the end of the decade. The students were clearly polarized: on the one hand, the marxists and marxist sympathizers, on the other hand, the fundamentalists. The marxist-progressist nebula was crossed by numerous currents, often running counter to one another, the two most important being the Khalq and the Parcham. This essentially urban agitation was strongly tinged with nationalism, except for the Parcham which favored an integration of Afghanistan to the USSR. Although the fundamentalists, too, had their origin in the anti-establishment youth (especially in scientific circles), they tried to express themselves in a rural environment and even caused serious unrest, for instance in Panjshir in 1975.

But the autocrat Daoud had soon repressed any anti-establishment tendency by instituting a police regime which forced the progressists into clandestinity and the fundamentalists into exile in Pakistan.

Therefore, directly or indirectly, the USSR was controlling nearly all of Afghanistan and had no interest in taking any risk whatsoever. However, Daoud was chafing under Soviet tutelage; he could not promote reforms, both because of a complex sociological situation and because of a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy which was indirectly maneuvered by the Soviet. As a result, he made vague attempts to free himself and establish relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Japan. This annoyed the Soviet who decided to replace him with a more docile character. The traditional way of rising to power in Afghanistan is by means of a coup. Therefore--so the Soviet thought--there would be no special risk of traumatizing the people. Nevertheless, the fateful date had not yet been set and the only order received by the Afghan communists in 1977 was to restore unity between Khalq and Parcham. This was done; the Soviet Union was counting more on the Parcham which comprised urban elite, lacking however any support among the people, and was waiting for it to broaden its audience before acting.

Therefore, as we can see, the USSR was carefully preparing a mere police operation and was waiting for the right moment to reduce the slight deviation of the Afghan government.

The second question is easier to answer when one knows that Khyber's assassination was the work of the Khalq. It so happened that Khyber was the parchami pro-Soviet theoretician in charge of relations with the army, the nationalist khalqi preserve. There are strong indications that his murder could have been the work of Hafizullah Amin's close entourage. No formal proof of this allegation has ever been supplied; Khyber's assassin has never been found, but all evidence, including that from khalqi sources, substantiate it. Nevertheless, his funeral was the occasion for a "unitarian" demonstration against the regime and many Kabul citizens not involved in internal communist struggles were drawn into this demonstration. Hafizullah Amin was the only one who was able

to postpone his arrest long enough to give instructions to the conspirators who were to send their tanks to Kabul one week later. The fact that a document extremely compromising for the Soviet—namely the detailed description of the coup prepared by Pouzanof to overthrow Daoud—was seized during a search of Taraki's home explains why the Soviet had to give Amin assurances that they would support the new regime which was to result from the now unavoidable coup. The Soviet had then enough time to go on a mission in the USSR, and Pouzanoff to prepare his fishing expedition.

The events that followed are known, and it was Daoud himself who gave leave to the tanks to besiege the presidential palace. Indeed, on the day when the ministers council was deciding the fate of the communists arrested at Khyber's funeral, the urban population stirred by Khalqi agitators demonstrated in the streets. One of Daoud's advisors, a member of the plot, took pretext of this unrest and suggested to have the palace guarded by tanks...

The day after the coup, the leaders, now heroes, were carried in triumph through the town. Witnesses even testify that Babrak Karmal shouted to Hafizullah Amin: "Well, you must be pleased now! You have what you wanted!"

However, while it is easy—at least in Afghanistan—to occupy the seat of power, it is much more difficult to exert power. The few Afghan communists who had eliminated Daoud were far from forming a homogeneous coalition, and the stronger wing (the Khalq) was also the most incompetent in affairs of state. Its only assets were that it controlled the army and enjoyed wider support among the people than the Parcham. In their determination to overthrow the regime, the Khalq had forgotten that the seat of power is empty in Afghanistan, that the government is questioned, even negated by most Afghan, and that the moods of an accultured urban minority were in no way an accurate reflection of the aspirations and demands of the majority of the Afghan people. They had also forgotten Islam, its transcending dimension, its normative character and its reference power.

To exert its control over the civilian societies, the new regime had to conquer all the organs of government and to provide them with actual substance in all the provinces of Afghanistan. The rivalries between Afghan communists were to hinder this process. The parchami were ousted from power, exiled, imprisoned, tortured or killed, to such an extent that, as early as July 1978, the USSR had to intervene to save those who were to be put in charge of the government it intended to restore.

The irreversibility of the process was becoming apparent; the USSR was greatly threatened by a basically nationalistic regime which brandished communism as a reference, a regime that caused the Afghan people to revolt through its excessive determination in imposing an atheistic doctrine to a deeply religious moslem people.

Obviously, those who had taken power were not prepared to exert it, as was confirmed after the coup by the best-advised of the parchami.

Therefore, the Afghan crisis may have been triggered by a minority of nationalist Afghan communists not under Soviet control. However, the most severe criticism comes from the communists who have survived the successive purges and are now living in clandestinity, with the resistance to the present regime. According to them, impetus would have come less from a premature decision of the Khalq than from a deliberate provocation by the ambitious Amin. At any rate, the Soviets appear to have been outstripped and, under these conditions, they had to intervene sooner or later.

It remained to be seen when and how the Soviet would intervene. It is essentially at this level that international considerations were taken into account. Since this was the first time that the USSR had to intervene directly outside the "recognized" socialist block, a correct assessment of western reactions was necessary. This was made easier by the Iranian crisis and the anti-U.S. wave expressed by the taking of hostages at the U.S. embassy in Tehran. Already, the absence of a U.S. reaction to the assassination of their ambassador in Kabul (14 February 1973) had been an encouraging sign for the USSR. The political inconsistency of Europe was another encouraging indication. It appeared that the division of the Arab world would facilitate the acceptance of a fait accompli, and Third-World nations were naturally expected to react in the direction of history, i.e. to take side against neo-colonialism and imperialism as represented by the West. Only China could be a problem, but its internal difficulties left it without any means of action. This piecing together of Soviet reasoning may border on caricature, but certainly the USSR was counting on the acceptance of the fait accompli, although accompanied with verbal protests. Besides, the operation was to be carried out quickly, and developing a firm policy against the USSR would require more time than it would take to normalize the situation in Afghanistan.

However, as it happened, the condemnation of the Soviet Union was more extensive than expected, it was renewed in front of all international authorities, at the UN, at the Conference of Islamic Countries, at NATO, ASEAN and the EEC. It also turned out that the military intervention proved to be a failure that strengthened the insurrection and turned it into a resistance movement, and that ideological propaganda gave new inspiration to fundamentalism, the most determined and consistent expression of Islam.

Simultaneously with this accumulation of failures, the international situation as well as East-West relations strongly deteriorated, unrest gained Eastern Europe, even though silence has now fallen over Poland.

Thus, the Afghan crisis illustrates the important role played by ideology in the communist system. Even though its failure as far as social progress and economic development are concerned is now widely recognized, it still remains the keystone of legitimacy in the USSR.

For instance, ideology does not force a regime to be egalitarian, but it gives it a promise of universal triumph. It does not deal with the ever disappointing present of communist regimes, but with the future of mankind, of which they are the armed guardians. Misadventures matter little to those who are sure of conquering. Outside the USSR, communism meets with rebellion, but it is

spreading; inside, the strengthening of its machinery is both proof that its ideal has not been achieved, and assurance that, in principle, its realization is pursued; the proof of the failure is also the means to overcome it. To put it briefly, the system is a dynamic failure; it safeguards itself by attacking. It is not safeguarded by its accomplishments, but by its expansion. Therefore, there is a certain logic in the USSR habit of invoking reasons of security to enlarge the system at its borders, and in trying either to consolidate it through normalization (Eastern Europe) or to install it through direct intervention (Afghanistan). The very legitimacy of the Soviet system is at stake when, as in Afghanistan, it cannot subjugate a nation. In this case, their lack of success is due to the fact that the ground was especially unfavorable.

In Afghanistan, the USSR is confronted with a strong ideological competition from Islam with its transcendental context and its transnational character; its long term effects cannot be anticipated or understood by the USSR. The latter also has to contend with a backlash from vague nationalistic aspirations it encouraged in the past and of which it must now rid itself without having been able to use them for its exclusive benefit.

Under Afghan conditions, the usual strategy of the USSR does not work. Taking control of a government that operates in a vacuum, of a government removed from all that represents the profound realities of the country, does not give the means to control and shape all elements of society. The Soviet method: everything through the government, is failing there.

We can assume that their inability to solve this problem is why the Kremlin leaders show a certain perplexity: a limited military engagement, neither a withdrawal nor a significant increase in the means engaged.

The original character of the Afghan conflict thus reveals the contradictions, the mistakes and the weaknesses of the communist system and puts an end to the myths of the USSR invulnerability. No matter how the Afghan crisis ends, from now on the king is naked.

9294  
CSO: 4619/101

PDPA PROGRAM OF ACTION PROCLAIMS URGENT TASKS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 17, 18 Apr 82

[Speech by Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA]

[17 Apr 82 p 2]

[Text]

**Following is the text of the Resolution of the countrywide PDPA Conference, held on March 14, with regard to the urgent tasks of the Party:**

The countrywide conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, after hearing the report of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan concerning the charting of the Programme of Action of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the present urgent duties in the field of consolidation of the party and the strengthening of its relations with the people, presented by Comrade Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, draws the conclusion that, as a whole, the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the state of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, follow persistently and consis-

tently a policy towards the solution of the basic problems of the resolution.

A deep and all-sided analysis and evaluation of the present stage of the national-democratic Revolution of Afghanistan has been made in the report and other materials and documents of the conference, and the ways to achieve further military and political victories, total annihilation of counter-revolution and establishment of peace in the country have been assessed. In these documents, the future of the revolution, major tasks of the party and the state in the field of maintaining possibilities of economic and social development of the country, raising the level of material and cultural life of the people, still further consolidation of unity of the party and elevation of its leading role in the society and the state has been deeply analysed.

Having in view the norms of the Programme of Acti-

on of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan as assessed in the report of Comrade Babrak Karmal, and the present situation in the country, the countrywide conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan believes that all the efforts of all party members and patriots should be mobilised towards achieving still greater victories in all fields for the progress of our beloved fatherland and the total defeat of the counter revolution.

Therefore the countrywide conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan approves:

1. The total and complete confirmation of the policy line and practical activity of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

2. The confirmation of the Programme of Action of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the decisions and duties envisaged in the report of Comrade Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and their unbiased implementation by all the party members. Accurate and consistent execution of the constitutional duties and the norms of the party constitution and practical and active participation in the revolutionary transformations of the country are considered as the basic standard in the field of evaluation of efficiency of work of the party and state organs and social organisations and the daily activities and approaches of all the full and probationary members of the People's

Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

3. The Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the party committees of the provinces, cities, districts and subdistricts, the general department of political affairs of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, department of political affairs of the police, State Information Services, primary party organisations, the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Ministries and their related departments, the Central Council of Trade Unions of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Central Committee of the Democratic Organisation of Afghanistan Youth, the Central Committee of the Democratic Organisation of Afghanistan Women, the unions of initiative intellectuals and other social organisations of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan should be given the duty to take practical and specific measures in the field of the application of the Programme of Action of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the resolutions of the countrywide conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and to organise strict control for their implementation.

The countrywide conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan considers the concentration of efforts of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the national fatherland front and all its member organisations as an urgent task in the solution of

urgent problems.

In the Military-Political field:

4. The intensification of struggle with the armed counter-revolution, establishment and still further consolidation of the popular power in the districts and subdistricts and the stabilisation of situation and consolidation of durable peace all over the country should form the major part of activities of the party committees, state organs and social organisations in the capital and the provinces beside the armed forces, the police and the State Information Services. For this consideration a single and general system of defence of the revolution which, beside the army contingents and units and security organs, includes also the groups for the defence of revolution and the voluntary groups of the tribes, should be created with confident grounds of their activities in all organisations and all parts of the country maintained.

Practical and effective party control should be maintained in the activity of the system of defence of the revolution, and finally it should be maintained that the masses of the people, together with the armed forces, the police and security organs undertake decisively the task of the defence of revolution until the total victory against the counter-revolution. Every patriot and every real Muslim should actively cooperate for the victory of the righteous task of the revolution.

5. The Central Committee

of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Revolutionary Council and the Council of Ministers, the Ministries and related departments and social organisations of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan should focus their serious attention to the problems related to the consolidation of the armed forces and the security organs, raising the level of political and combat preparedness of the military cadres and military and patriotic training of the toilers and the youth, and should pay special attention to the training and nurturing of leading cadres of the armed forces and its completion from the rank of the representatives of toiling masses loyal to the task of the revolution. For this consideration, the role of the party organisations, the officials of political works, military contingents and units, police forces and the State Information Services should be increased and the links between the military forces and productive collectives and social organisations should be consolidated.

6. The party committees the organs of the state power, while crushing the counterrevolution, should add to their activities a series of urgent measures such as broad explanatory work, co-operation in the settlement of serious economic problems, opening of polyclinics, schools, repairing the roads and bridges, holding of jirgahs (meetings) appointment of responsible persons from among the local citizens and creation of gr-

oups for the defence of revolution in accord with the wants of the people which consolidate permanently the popular power.

In the socio-economic field:

7. The Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Council of Ministers, the ministries and departments of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the party and social organisations, the state organs and economic establishments in the provinces should take adequate measures consistently and in accordance with the plan, towards the all sided development and solution of the urgent social problems.

Prior to all, it is necessary that the continued work of the industrial organisations should maintain electricity, transportation, communications and the industrial and agricultural productions. They should concentrate all necessary power for the revival and reactivation of all the destroyed establishments of the national economy, and should pay serious attention to the problems related to the increase of social activities of toilers, growth of productivity of work and economisation in the field of material sources and work in the productive collectives.

On the basis of the decisions of the political bureau of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Revolutionary Council and the Council of Ministers of

the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the agrarian reforms and water distribution should be more consistently implemented and help should be given to farmers in relation to the level of production of agricultural crops and for the establishment of agricultural cooperatives should co-operate with the farmers and the members of cooperatives through agricultural and technical aids.

The provincial, district and subdistrict, party committees, organs of the state power in the provinces should pay adequate attention to the task of promoting regular attention to the task of promoting regular agricultural activities and ensuring their security.

These organs should get their planned policy realised towards meeting the peoples' needs in the field of residence, cultural and enlightening organisations, eradication of illiteracy among the people, and should create various curative and preventive medicine networks and anti-epidemic institutions and state pharmacies especially in the villages.

In one of the alternate plenums of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan the specific economic problems were deliberated and specific measures were taken with regard to the consolidation and completion of national economy of the country, the methods and forms of party leadership over the economic activities.

[Text]

In the field of development and consolidation of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan:

The nationwide conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan points out that the successful implementation of the Programme of Action of the People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is among the urgent problems of the process of the April Revolution and prior to all is related to the increasing of the leading role of the party, raising of the combat ability and activity of the party committees, primary party organisations, all the full and probationary members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in organising the defence of the revolution, political education of the masses and struggle in the way of economic and cultural building of the society. This task requires unity, ideological and organisational integrity of the party, democratic growth of the inner party, and based on it, the discipline, organisation and development of methods of party activity. The role and importance of the primary party organisations in the solution of all party problems should be decisively increased and should be all-sidedly consolidated as the vital pillar of the party and ensurer of direct link of the party with the broad masses of the people.

The work in the field of improving the qualitative composition of the party ranks, should be under the special attention of the Ce-

ntral Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, its departments, committees and party organisations as a major issue especially through the attraction of greater numbers of workers, peasants, craftsmen, soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the army and the police to the party.

For this consideration, the party committees should make wide use of the present campaign of the distribution of party documents and the organisational and political experiences gained in the course of preparations and convocation of the nationwide conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan on the basis of the Constitution and constitutional documents of the party.

The results of the nationwide conference of the party should be evaluated in the meetings of the party activists and committees and in the meetings of the primary party organisations and the resolutions of the nationwide conference should be deeply studied and discussed and adequate measures should be taken in the field of their implementation.

9. The Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the party sections and organisations should fulfill consistent and objective work toward the selection and deployment and training of cadres especially in the leading authorities. Decisive struggle should be waged against all kinds of

deviations from the party policy with regard to the cadres. The main standard of the assessment of the cadres should be their political and practical characteristics, their active participation in the revolutionary transformations of the country and their loyalty to the party leadership. The representatives of the toilers, national minorities, the youth and the women who struggle honestly, must be given promotion.

The Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan should study and research the possibilities of the creation of the system of party, political and specialised learning and the renovation of teachings of the cadres in the cadre of the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and other educational institutes and courses which are permanently active in the capital and the provinces.

10. The leading role of the party over the organs of the state power and social organisations of the country should be increased. Work in the field of the completion of law making and the creation of grounds for its realisation, elevation of efficiency of the activities of state apparatuses and consolidation of relations with the masses in the interest of the people and revolution should be expanded.

In the field of ideological work of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan:

11. The Central Commit-

tee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, its sections and the party committees should intensify the work in the field of attraction of the masses toward the revolution, maintaining the joint efforts of all strata of the society in the way of the defence of its gains and the construction of a new and blossoming society.

For this consideration, a series of measures and specific and urgent steps should be taken and implemented toward the eradication of political and general illiteracy of the citizens and in the field of struggle with the effects of the bourgeoisie and feudal ideology. All these works should be together with the comprehension and expansion of the advanced revolutionary theory.

The conference draws the attention of party organisations to the need of specific approach with the political work among the masses, especially among the peasants, and the concentration of all the forces of the party towards it.

The Central Committee and all the party organisations should try by using all forms of political learning to permanently raise the level of ideological and theoretical knowledge of the full and probationary members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, and should pay special attention to still further improve the training of propagatory and promotion cadres of the party.

12. At the present stage, a deep and all sided study of

the programme of action, decisions and materials of the nationwide conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan should be placed in the order of the day of the political, popular and ideological training.

The major task is that the ideas and opinions and decisions of the conference should be conveyed to every one of the party members, to every one of the citizens of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and make them all understand them. For this consideration the methods of popular and mass propagation work should be greatly and effectively used, such as activity of propagation and publicity groups, meetings, rallies of the peasants and talks and speeches by the political speakers and propagators of the Central Committee, organising voluntary work (Ashar) in the workers' collectives and in the residential areas of the citizens and holding of traditional celebrations of the people etc.

The activity of the means of mass media should be seriously improved in accordance with the vital needs. For the purpose of better coordination of all ideological activities and to increase their efficiency, the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the party committees should convene meetings of ideological activists and seminars concerning the urgent problems of the present stage of the revolution.

13. The nationwide con-

ference, in accord with the norms of its Programme of Action and the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan confirms the correctness of its consistent and principled policy with regard to the holy religion of Islam. At the same time it urges the party committees and organs of the state power to intensify the work in the field of the exposition of anti-popular activity of the enemies of the revolution who have covered their criminal actions under the motto of Islam.

14. The countrywide conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, having realised the great importance of the national and tribal relations in the country, advises the Central Committee, the Revolutionary Council, the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, party and state organs in the localities and the national fatherland front to try in the way of consistent implementation of the policy of the party based on the really equal rights of growth and development of all nationalities, tribes and clans and their cooperation for the prosperity and blossoming of our

single and common country. Propagation activities in the field of the policy of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in this regard, based on the norms of the Programme of Action, the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the declaration of the party and the state in the field of relations of nationalities, tribes and clans of Afghanistan, should be intensified.

15. The countrywide conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan fully and completely confirms the activities of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in the arena of the foreign policy, which is pursued towards a durable world peace and stabilization of political situation in the region, implementation of the principles of militant international solidarity, peaceful coexistence and nonalignment. It advises the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the party and state organs to propagate consistently the policy of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in the arena of international relations inside and outside the country

consistently and allsidedly grow and develop the internationalist and fraternal relations of friendship with the great Leninist party, i.e., the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, traditional friendship and cooperation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and fraternal socialist countries. They should extensively acquaint the masses of the people with their achievements and gains in the task of building a new life.

Relations should be expanded and broadened with all the countries and international organisations on the basis of the geeral principles of equality of rights and respect to the mutual interests.

The countrywide conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan calls on all the party organisations, all the full and probationary party members and all the patriots to still further close their ranks and should not spare their power for the implementation of the lofty and honest goals of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan which are indicative of the basic wants of our people.

Victory is ours!

CSO: 4600/467

SECOND MAIN BURSTS IN MUSKI

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 16 May 82 p 10

[Text] Another water main yesterday burst in Port Sa'id Street, 15 meters from the principal main which burst yesterday.

Repair operations on the principal main had been underway all yesterday by workers of the Cairo Water Utilities when, during repair work in the afternoon, the workers were surprised by the bursting of another main in the area opposite the gas station on Port Sa'id Street. The water gushed out and flooded the surrounding streets, where the water level rose to 30 centimeters.

The new burst caused traffic coming from Salah Salim and al-Azhar Streets to be diverted to other streets. Four ratchet pumps belonging to the Cairo governorate were used to remove the water.

Mr Sa'd Ma'mun, governor of Cairo, received an initial report on the incident which said that the result of the burst was a large gap 7 meters long, 4 meters wide, and 3 meters deep and that an inspection had established the presence of a shears derrick, being used as a crane, belonging to the Arab Contractors Company, which is working on building the bridge.

First Sgt Abu al-'Ala Sayyid Ahmad of the mid-Cairo traffic unit assigned to the area reported that he had seen three workers from the company responsible for building the bridge working on a crane equipped with a drill which was being rotated directly over the principal main and he was surprised a few hours later by water spouting from the main and the three workers fleeing.

CSO: 4504/319

NDP PROBES SINAI TRANSPORT PLAN

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 12 May 82 p 2

[Text]

A PLAN to link Sinai with Cairo and the other governorates by using a large number of public transport buses, was discussed yesterday at a meeting held by the Transport and Telecommunications Committee of the National Democratic Party under the chairmanship of Mr. Abdul Fattah Abdulla.

The Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Yehia el-Zayyat, said that the plan includes the operation of five first class bus lines between Cairo — el-Arish, Cairo — St. Catherine, Cairo — el-Tor — Sharm el-Sheikh, el-Arish — Zagazig and St. Catherine — Suez — Fayed — 10th of Ramadan city.

The plan also includes the operating of six local bus lines to link el-Arish — Rafah, el-Arish — El-Hasna, el-Arish — Bir el-Abd — Massaied, El-Tor — St. Catherine, el-Tor — Suez and el-Tor — Sharm el-Sheikh. These bus lines will facilitate the transport between the North

and the South Sinai Governorates, Mr. El-Zayat said.

This network of roads to link Sinai with Cairo, Alexandria and the governorates of the Delta requires more than 30 air conditioned buses and a similar number of ordinary buses. The total length of the roads included within this network would reach 5,200 kilometres.

On the other hand, Mr. El-Zayat added, the Committee approved a project to purchase four mobile workshops for the maintenance of the buses operated on these new lines. The mobile workshops will be later supported with a number of workshops to be established at el-Arish, el-Tor, St. Catherine and Sharm el-Sheikh.

Meanwhile, the Chairman of the Operation and Maintenance Department of the Ahmed Hamdi Tunnel, Mr. el-Sherbini el-Disouki, yesterday announced that four groups of cars will be permitted to pass

through the tunnel daily until the power equipment required for the tunnel will be completely installed.

These four groups of cars comprise tourist buses and tractors transporting goods and building materials required for the people of Sinai. Each group comprises 15 cars accompanied by two fire-engines as a precaution.

Tankers loaded with inflammable materials will not be allowed to pass through the tunnel as well as giant trailers, which can endanger the tunnel because of their broad bodies and heavy weight.

Mr El-Disouki also said that the first group of cars will pass through the tunnel from the west bank of the Suez Canal to Sinai at 9 am while the second group will pass through the tunnel at 2 pm. The other two groups will pass through the tunnel from the opposite direction at 9.30 am and 2.30 pm. — MEN.

CSO: 4500/176

EVENTS IN TEHRAN EXAMINED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 6 May 82 pp 1-2

[Text] The Tehran public was understandably feeling thoroughly bemused by the onrush of events over the past few days. And even the regime's worst critics were commanding it on the dexterous way it was handling its volatile propaganda machine.

Towards the end of last week there had been a widespread concern over the possible fate of the country's longtime senior theologian Kazem Shariat-Madari, who had been implicated in a coup plot headed by arrested former foreign minister Sadegh Qotbzadeh. There were calls for Shariat-Madari to face the supreme penalty.

Then news came in of a new offensive against the Iraqi invaders, with an attempt, initially hailed as successful and later confirmed by events, to establish an Iranian bridgehead across the wide Karun River near the occupied port of Khorramshahr. Other troop movements were designed to threaten Iraqi communication lines to the north and thus weaken their opposition to the Iranian landings. The issue of Shariat-Madari was temporarily shelved as far as the media was concerned and public attention diverted to the war.

By Sunday, however, it seemed obvious to shrewd observers that the military offensive was not going to live up to Tehran's hopes, since it seemed to have been mounted much earlier than commanders in the south had originally hinted. But good synchronisation between naval chiefs, who had their ships in the river estuary to provide an umbrella for the troops who made the bridgehead, and the air force, who were active in attacking Iraqi reinforcements heading for the front, kept the Iranian forces at least in their early acquired positions.

Back in Tehran the radio and television suddenly put out what appeared to be a doctored interview with Shariat-Madari, which purported to be a confession that he had been wrong not to report information he had about a coup plot to the authorities. It seemed to be the authorities' way of winding up the matter and consigning Shariat-Madari to limbo for the rest of his days, dissipating all significance he might have for the Iranian public at large. The return to the subject suggested all wasn't going according to plan in the war.

The fact that his family and supporters saw this was shown by a statement issued by Shariat-Madari's son in West Germany which purported to be a denial by the

elderly ayatollah that he had publicly repented. The elder Shariat-Madari said he did not consider it his religious duty to send to their deaths people who had confided in him, even though he did not agree with their aims. The younger Shariat-Madari claimed the interview shown on television in Iran was an adulterated version of an eight-hour interrogation conducted under pressure by the military prosecutor Mohammad Reyshahri. During the questioning the ayatollah had in fact said that in the event of his having been mistaken in perception of his religious duties then he would ask God's forgiveness. He did not concede that he had made a mistake, as the regime officials suggested. Shariat-Madari's aides had already warned that the Tehran regime had given signs the interrogation would be used to serve their purposes.

#### Blow to Mojahedin

No sooner had the public absorbed all this than there came news of a skillfully planned attack on the hideout of prominent activists of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq in Tehran. At least 10 people died in gun battles but the regime claimed it held 50 people after the attacks on several hideouts. Among the names of the dead announced were those of two members of the Mojahedin movement, Fazlollah Tadayun and Hamid Khadami, who stood for parliamentary elections two years ago, and three women. There was no mention of the name of Mojahedin's new leader inside Iran, Ali Zarkesh, but Iran watchers sensed that the Mojahedin could have suffered a very severe blow through this latest move. It was obvious, too, that while the regime in Tehran consistently demonstrated its power it could rely on public informers seeking to ingratiate themselves to let them know of all kinds of suspicious activities.

The news of the crash of the Algerian foreign minister's plane on its way to Tehran, with fatal consequences for him and all on board, did not have the impact of tragedy it might have had in the face of all these other events. But the regime's propaganda machine quickly insisted that the aircraft had been deliberately shot down by Iraqi planes and that it had proof of this on tapes. The deputy foreign minister, Ahmad Azizi, flew up to the scene of the crash near the Turkish border; while he was investigating the three-man crew of his craft flew it across the border a few miles away and asked for asylum.

The Algerian minister, Mohammad Ben Yahya, had been involved with Irano-Arab affairs over a long period, and it was generally believed that his mission was partly to urge the mullahs to consider talking peace. The plane crashed outside the air corridor from Turkey to Tehran. In the Iranian capital, premier Hossain Mussavi promised Iran and its people would "avenge the blood of this martyr."

The Turkish foreign ministry said it had no knowledge of an attack on the plane. The state-owned Algerian news agency said "the circumstances surrounding this painful event are still unknown," but said an investigating team was on its way from Algeria.

CSO: 4600/477

LATEST POLITICAL CURRENTS IN POWER STRUCTURE ANALYZED

Relentless Repression of Dissidents

Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Apr 82 p 6

[Article by Jean Gueyras]

[Text] Hojjatol-Eslam Tabrizi, public prosecutor for the revolutionary courts, announced on Tuesday 27 April that the trial of Qotbzadeh, accused of trying to assassinate Imam Khomeyni, would be made public and that the court would be presided over by a civilian revolutionary judge.

In an unrelated development on Sunday, the military authorities announced the start of a new offensive against Kurdish autonomists near the border city of Marivan. And the Tehran press is reporting that dozens of Qashqa'i have died while fighting guardians of the revolution in the southern part of the country. The Qashqa'i, who had already rebelled against the central government once before--in 1980--are now accused of having ties with the Mojahedin-e Khalq.

Meanwhile, the Islamic republic is having to face some formidable immediate problems, as our special correspondent reports below.

Tehran--The foreign traveler who lands at Mehrabad Airport is surprised at the calm and order prevailing there. The slogans calling on the inhabitants to continue the war "for as long as 20 years if necessary" against the "Iraqi invader" are the traveler's only reminder that he has just landed in the capital of a country which has been carrying on a relentless external war for nearly 19 months while also engaged in latent civil war, but which has challenged itself to present a calm appearance.

The slipshod pasdarans (guardians of the revolution) have given way to finicky customs officials. The absence of any military or police protection in the airport buildings and the surrounding area borders on nonchalance, considering the bloody attacks that have cost the lives of a good many leaders over the

past 10 months. The pictures of the "shohada" (martyrs) are numerous in the airport lobby, which has taken on the look of an exhibit in honor of the revolution.

Amazement increases as one approaches the swarming center of the capital. Everything seems normal, and only confirmed "Tehranologists" can say that this or that fast-moving armored Mercedes with its tinted windows belongs to the "committees," the pasdaran, or a high official in the regime. There is no doubt that the authorities have succeeded in correcting certain shortcomings in security that not long ago were shaking the Islamic republic.

The brutality of the repression that followed the attacks and the merciless struggle carried on against the Mojahedin have favored the reorganization of the security forces, which have become more vigilant. The neighborhoods where the ministries are located have been isolated by metal barriers that cannot be crossed without going through numerous and tedious inspections. Concrete hog-backs have been built in the vicinity of pasdaran barracks and the headquarters of the "committees"--some of which have been transformed into real fortresses--so that the occupants of vehicles traveling at breakneck speed cannot open fire before disappearing in the capital's maze of streets.

As soon as the sun goes down, the city sinks into total darkness. The official reason for the blackout is the state of war, but it also makes sizable energy savings possible. Traffic is then detoured away from all buildings considered strategic, and drivers are subjected to identity checks and sometimes searched.

According to officials, the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization has been virtually dismantled. Some of the attacks reported almost daily on the inside pages of the newspapers are attributed to them, however, under their official designation as "monafeqin" (hypocrites), while others are blamed on "agents of the monarchy and Savak." For their part, "Tehranologists" distinguish between the two kinds of attacks: the Mojahedin go after the regime's religious or civilian figures, while the "monarcho-Savakists" strike indiscriminately at the civilian population.

In any case, the frequency and importance of those attacks (one or two a day), committed in a capital as vast as Tehran, are not enough to distract the people from their occupations. All the more since the security forces dispatched to the scene of an attack erase all signs of the operation immediately to prevent crowds from collecting.

The fact remains that the death of Musa Khiabani, the military leader of the Mojahedin, struck a severe blow at the organization, whose members have gone completely underground. While it may be true--as some of their sympathizers claim--that the Mojahedin have been deprived of their central leadership, cells are operating autonomously and in extended order. New paramilitary groups are said to be undergoing training in Kurdistan, however.

The apparent normalization of the situation in Tehran is apparently welcomed with relief by a population traumatized by the bloody escalation of violence. In private, some of the Mojahedin's sympathizers criticize the path chosen by

the group's leaders, who were unable to avoid the trap set for them. The critics would have preferred an opposition policy not based exclusively on terrorism.

#### Relentless Repression

Those we spoke to admit, however, that it is now too late to adopt a peaceful path because the repression has become so relentless. All official statements concerning a possible relaxation of the penal procedure have so far remained a dead letter. The amnesty granted on the anniversary of the revolution was singularly restrictive. Ayatollah Rabbani Amlashi, the public prosecutor, had stated, incidentally, that those who cannot be "brought back to a normal life through reeducation are condemned to death by Islam."

It is true that the newspapers no longer publish columns of the names of those arrested or executed, as they did until last December. But the stories passed along by word of mouth tell of arbitrary arrests, torture, and summary executions. One case reported to us concerned a 24-year-old Iranian in desperate condition who was taken to a Tehran hospital last 22 March by pasdarans. His kidneys had stopped functioning, his swollen legs showed obvious signs that he had been suspended by his feet, and his toenails had been torn out.

It is probable, however, that the frequency of arrests, executions, and torture has declined precisely because terrorism has slowed down, and perhaps also because of protests abroad by humanitarian organizations. The fact remains that since June 1981, Red Cross representatives have not been allowed to visit Evin Prison, which Tehran prosecutor Lajevardi has transformed into a sinister and impenetrable fortress.

Nearly a year after the conclusion of the hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy, the anti-Americanism of the leaders has not abated. The walls surrounding the former chancery were whitewashed and then covered with new slogans denouncing "the great Satan." The "nest of spies" remains the compulsory rallying point for marches that are organized periodically. The loudspeakers used to mobilize crowds are still in place for stigmatizing the alliance of the United States with "Saddam" (Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi chief of state). The inscriptions hostile to "cowboy Carter" have been replaced by others ridiculing "cowboy Reagan." Nonchalant pasdarans, sometimes seen on the watchtowers, wander around the vast expanse of the embassy, which has become an "anti-American Bastille." There have been successive suggestions to turn "the den of Satan" into a reeducation camp for the "enemies of the revolution," a hospital, and even "a museum of the crimes of American imperialism." Those proposals have all been rejected by the authorities, who do not seem to have decided on the final use to be made of the building. It is said that some of the "students faithful to the Imam's line" are still working in the building to decode confidential documents that were seized in more or less good shape during the occupation of the embassy. About 15 volumes reproducing some of those documents have already been published, and they sold out rapidly. It is said here that others may contain "disagreeable revelations" concerning some highly placed figures in the regime.

### Popularity Difficult To Assess

Something else that attracts the attention of a reporter returning to Tehran after an absence of over 2 years is the fact that the "suggestions" being made to women to comply with the Koran's instructions have become more exacting. Fewer and fewer women dare to appear on the street without the "Islamic scarf" covering their hair. Some religious groups are now demanding that that "hejab" frame the face and cover the shoulders. The public prosecutor for the revolution, Hojjatol-Eslam Musavi Tabrizi, has just suggested that "women who do not wear the Islamic veil" be outlawed from society. Taxi and bus drivers have been ordered not to pick up women who refuse to obey, and merchants have been ordered not to wait on them. Hojjatol-Eslam Tabrizi has even threatened to purge government offices of women who "wear the veil at work, but not on the street."

The regime's popularity, doubtless undermined, is difficult to assess. Imam Khomeyni's charisma also remains, especially among the underprivileged masses, who benefit from various measures adopted on their behalf through the network of mosques and who willingly take to the streets, although in numbers substantially smaller than in the past. Officials attribute all of Iran's troubles to "Islam's internal and external enemies," but more and more people in the least privileged classes of the population are beginning to think and even say that the guide of the revolution bears a large share of the responsibility for the economic crisis and the deteriorating standard of living.

The government maintains that all of the country's troubles are the result of a war that was forced on it and the direct consequence of the West's economic blockade. On the other hand, it says nothing about the rivalries between the various factions, despite the ousting of former President Bani-Sadr. Those rivalries even seem to have been exacerbated by the struggle over the succession.

Is it to preserve the fiction of their unanimity that foreign reporters are not allowed contact with the leaders?

### Problems of Succession

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Apr 82 p 5

[Article by Jean Gueyras]

[Text] Despite the apparent normalization of the situation in Tehran, where authorities seem to have solved the problem of terrorism at least in part, the rivalries between the regime's various factions remain. They even seem to have been exacerbated by the struggle to choose Imam Khomeyni's successor (see LE MONDE, 29 April [above]).

Tehran--Rumors concerning Imam Khomeyni's death regularly circulate abroad and are amplified by opposition radio stations, but they are never taken seriously in Iran despite the age of the "guide of the revolution." Everyone here knows,

however, that the 82-year-old man is in poor health and makes it a rule, on orders from his physicians, to take more or less prolonged periods of "total rest," which he interrupts from time to time to occupy himself with urgent matters of state. The victory at Dezful, described in Iran as "Fath o mobin" (obvious victory), seems to have breathed new energy into him. Since then the Imam has resumed his public activities, constantly receives foreign visitors of note and soldiers back from the front, and delivers interminable televised speeches in a voice which, while certainly weak, is steady. Everything indicates that he is still in a combative mood and that all his faculties are intact.

The Imam's role is not limited, incidentally, to delivering speeches. Nothing important is done without consulting him, and he sometimes occupies himself with resolving political or military questions in detail, although most often he is content to arbitrate the conflicts which, despite the defeat of the Islamic republic's opponents, continue to exist among those holding the chief levers of power.

Some of his opponents hope that the Imam's disappearance--that inescapable and major challenge to the regime--will, ipso facto, result in the regime's collapse and give the signal for a new civil war among the various power centers that coexist within the state's various institutions. On the other hand, it can be considered that a system capable of surviving the successive physical elimination in a single month of Ayatollah Beheshti, President Raja'i, and Prime Minister Bahonar will not be swept away by the death of the "guide of the revolution."

Having come within a hair's breadth of disaster in June and July 1981, the various religious and civilian factions orbiting around the Imam have succeeded in toning down their differences and have strengthened the state's basic structures, thus insuring its continuity. It can easily be imagined that the various people holding power, being equally threatened, will close ranks in such an eventuality instead of immediately crossing swords with each other, as their opponents hope.

Even so, one must not underestimate the seriousness of the personal rivalries and ideological-political disagreements which coexist among the clergy and within the ruling circles and which have thus far prevented implementation of the articles in the Islamic Constitution for insuring a smooth succession among the top officials. This gap is due chiefly to the fact that none of the forces opposing each other is powerful enough to impose its own will and its own candidate. The Islamic Republican Party (IRP) was originally established to be the leading party, but it has been considerably weakened by the attack that cost the lives of Ayatollah Beheshti and most of its top cadres. The extent of the disaster seems to have been intentionally minimized, but it appears that the IRP no longer exists as a structured political organization and that it is now simply a group of highly placed figures whose views, in many cases, are diametrically opposed to each other.

### Role of Hojatieh Deputies

President Khamenei, who before becoming chief of state was regarded as one of the IRP's most radical members, has moved a considerable distance toward conservative stands in both the political and the economic fields. Being anxious to remain above the fray, he has never taken a stand against certain excesses committed by the religious groups and is said to have recently moved closer to the Islamic extremist deputies in the Majlis who belong to the group known as the Hojatieh. The latter, who have about 50 representatives in Parliament, are known for their fierce hostility to the Bahais and for their violent anticomunism. They are said to want a rapprochement with the West and a strengthening of the state's repressive character. Being numerous enough in Parliament to block moves they disapprove of, they have long delayed implementation of the bills on agrarian reform and nationalization of foreign trade, which many religious groups regard as "anti-Islamic." And Velayati, the new minister of foreign affairs, whose views are said to have recently moved closer to those of the Hojatieh, is reportedly responsible for the normalization of relations with Turkey and Pakistan, which were still being described just recently as "reactionary countries in the pay of the United States."

In Parliament, the group of Hojatieh deputies frequently opposes the group known as "the followers of the Imam's line," whose key figure is Hojjatol-Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Majlis. But one cannot draw an airtight line of separation between the two groups. Some deputies supporting the Imam's line often turn out to be more extremist than the Hojatieh, depending on what is being voted on. But one conclusion forces itself on all observers: the "extremists" currently have the wind in their sails. They are reportedly behind the quarrel between Tehran and Moscow, whose Ambassador Vinogradov, having completed his tour of duty last March, has not yet been replaced. And with the help of other rightwing groups represented in Parliament, they also seem to have succeeded in imposing an anticomunist policy whose ultimate objective is to destroy the political life of the Tudeh party and its allies, the Fedayin majority.

What is called here the "Moslem Right" has already succeeded in getting the authorities to close down most Tudeh-related publications, and the Tudeh is gradually being relegated to a kind of semiunderground existence. In that connection, one spokesman for the communist party told us that his organization and the Fedayin majority, which pursues the same policy of conditional support for the regime, were fearful of new restrictions on their activity. The Tudeh feels, however, that the game is not yet over and that despite the setbacks, nothing decisive has yet been accomplished in the permanent struggle between the "extremist Islamic Right" and the "realistic view of power." Another party representative added: "We will not begin to worry in earnest until government policy begins to show serious signs of an irreversible change in the anti-imperialist and anti-American policy that the regime has pursued since the revolution."

However that may be, the "Qotbzadeh plot" being officially presented here as inspired by the CIA constitutes proof that for the moment, there is no sign that the official line is sliding in the direction of conciliatory stands on "American imperialism."

## Difficult Succession

The Qotbzadeh affair and, even more, the charges made against Ayatollah Shari'at Madari would be incomprehensible if they were not viewed within the framework of the power struggle being waged by the various clerical factions to insure that Imam Khomeyni is succeeded by someone favorable to their particular interests. The succession appears all the more difficult in that there is currently no successor likely to win unanimous support. There was talk for a time of Ayatollah Montazeri being the best-placed candidate. He is completely devoted to the Imam, whose sister he is said to have married, and he shares without reservation the Imam's religious and political convictions, especially the concept of the "velayat-e faqih," which gives the religious guide of the "umma" [community of the faithful] the right to examine temporal and spiritual matters and which, as it happens, insures Imam Khomeyni of the prerogatives of a "guardian of the people" under the terms of the Islamic Constitution.

The constitution provides that if the "faqih" disappears, he will be replaced by a new religious guardian who has the same qualifications as the Imam and who is "universally respected." In the absence of a consensus concerning the choice of that dignitary, an assembly of experts consisting of 61 "mojtahed" (doctors of theology), elected by universal suffrage, is to appoint a trustee council consisting of three or five "faqih." Considering that most of Iran's six ayatollahs-ozmas, who rule the roost in religious matters, oppose the notion of the velayat-e faqih, it is easy to see why that assembly of experts, which under the terms of the Islamic republic's constitution should have been elected and functioning during 1981, does not yet exist.

It is highly probable that Imam Khomeyni did not want the meeting of an assembly likely to offend him and to give substance to the idea that his end was near. Above all, it is certain that the Imam fears the election of a conclave whose majority would be hostile to the principle of the velayat-e faqih. The elimination of Ayatollah Shari'at Madari, a firm opponent of that concept, could thus serve as a warning to the other ayatollahs-ozmas and, possibly, contribute to the election of an assembly more obedient to the Imam's wishes.

The spiritual leader in Azarbaijan did more than simply oppose the "guide of the revolution's" religious and political doctrines. He had also conspicuously boycotted the referendum on the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, which institutionalizes the principle of the velayat-e faqih, before taking refuge in disapproving silence following the failure of the insurrection in Tabriz. It is true that Ayatollah Shari'at Madari does not deny the existence in Shiite Islam of the rule in question, but he feels that implementation of that principle runs counter to the people's sovereignty and prepares the way for a dictatorship.

The question remains as to why the Imam's followers chose that precise moment to go after Azarbaijan's spiritual leader at the risk of provoking disturbances in Tabriz on top of the rebellion in Kurdistan and the state of occasional insecurity that prevails in Baluchistan. Opinions differ on this subject. Some say that in the final analysis, the influence of Ayatollah Shari'at Madari was

overestimated and that his silence, being viewed by the opposition as "servile passiveness" toward the regime, has reduced his prestige. Others feel that the Tehran authorities took the precaution of weakening Ayatollah Shari'at Madari's means of counterattack by recently undertaking the military expulsion from Azarbaijan of clerics favorable to him.

According to a third version, the government thesis of a "Qotbzadeh-Shari'at Madari plot" is not without foundation, because preparations for antigovernment action were in fact being made in circles surrounding the patriarch of Azarbaijan. According to this version, the Tehran leaders, in a strong position because of their recent victory in the field, felt that the time was right for striking at the illustrious dissident in Qom before resuming the offensive on the Iraqi front.

#### Effects of War Victories

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 May 82 p 5

[Article by Jean Gueyras]

[Text] The hidden war to choose Imam Khomeyni's successor may explain why Ayatollah Shari'at Madari was implicated in the "Qotbzadeh plot." The patriarch of Azarbaijan has never concealed his hostility toward the concept of the velayat-e faqih, which gives the Imam and his successor the right to examine the country's temporal affairs. His stand is shared by most of the Shiite religious dignitaries (see LE MONDE, 29 and 30 April [above]).

Tehran--"Palestinian brothers, follow our example and remember that you are lost if you let yourselves be dragged into interminable negotiations." Leaning on a rifle, Hojjatol-Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, temporary leader of the Friday prayers, was addressing the faithful squatting in the vast sports field at Tehran University. Several members of the government, representatives of Islamic institutions, pasdarans, and conscripts could be seen in the front rows. A short distance away were the "shohada" (war martyrs), seated in their wheelchairs.


Although they are discreet about the number of victims--estimated at more than 60,000 dead and an equal number wounded--the authorities no longer try to conceal the extent and seriousness of the losses sustained at the front. It is difficult to walk through Tehran's streets without meeting disabled servicemen. The capital's hospitals are overflowing with wounded. The former Park Hotel, with its discreet colonial charm, has been converted into a convalescent home managed by the "Martyrs Foundation." It is a rare family that has been spared by the war, even though that war seems far away. The Armenian community (with nearly 200,000 members) admits to having lost nearly 20 of its young men. Their pictures, framed in black, are conspicuously displayed alongside those of their Persian brothers-in-arms in Tehran neighborhoods where Armenians are concentrated.

The Iraqi offensive launched on 22 March ended on the 28th following a breakthrough by Tehran troops that brought the latter over 50 kilometers closer to the frontier and removed the Iraqi threat to the cities of Dezful and Shush.

During that lightning offensive, the Iranians liberated the locality of Ein-Khosh, located 17 kilometers from the frontier in the northern part of the sector. They also occupied the Fakah Heights, the hub of the strategic north-south road, thus cutting the Iraqi lines and gaining control of the only route for penetrating Iraq in the direction of the city of Amara, 60 kilometers away on the Tigris River. Farther south, the strategically important Rekabeich Pass was occupied, and the heights surrounding Bostan--liberated in December 1981--were cleared.

According to Tehran, over 2,000 square kilometers of territory were retaken during the offensive and about 30 Iraqi brigades (approximately 75,000 soldiers) were put out of action, with 15,000 being taken prisoner and an equal number killed or wounded.

- Key:
1. Areas occupied by Iraq
  2. Dezful
  3. Shush
  4. Rekabeich Pass



### More Closely Knit Armed Forces

Tehran's walls are covered with interminable inscriptions glorifying those who accepted "martyrdom to save Islam." The praise of "martyrdom" is one of the major themes in Imam Khomeini's televised speeches. But the recent "Fath o mobin" (obvious victory) over the Iraqi Army was not due solely to the suicidal courage of the young men to whom tribute is constantly paid, even though there is a lot of talk about the heroism of the tens of thousands of unarmed young volunteers from the "besij" (servicemen) organization who threw themselves like kamikazes into the minefields surrounding the Iraqi positions.

Of course, that epic does rest on a real fact. Those volunteers--most of them young lycee students educated and trained by the mullahs with their parents' consent--played an essential role during the second battle of Bostan last February. By rushing the enemy positions with their shrouds on their backs, they enabled the pasdarans and the army following them to seize objectives that were particularly well defended.

That "terrible sacrifice" does not seem to have been repeated during the battle of Dezful. The "besij" certainly participated in the fighting with exemplary courage. But this time the Iranians, more concerned about their losses, had sent donkeys into the minefields and, in particular, the Iraqis had blown up most of their own minefields at daybreak on 22 March in preparation for a vast counteroffensive that was forestalled by the Iranian attack.

According to all Western observers in Tehran, the victory at Dezful and Shush was the result of three factors: the undeniable improvement and modernization of the Tehran war machine, the high morale of the Iranian fighters, and, above all--according to some sources--the unbelievable incompetence of the Iraqi military. Until the first few months of 1981, the Iranian war effort had been hindered by the distrust felt by the regular army--inherited from the shah--for the pasdarans organized to defend the revolution. Little by little, the Supreme Defense Council, which included the various regular and irregular military forces, was able to smooth out disagreements and contradictions. The very recent introduction of the "besij" on the battlefields gave the Tehran leaders, who controlled them closely, a new trump card for reducing the rivalry between the army and the pasdarans, which is said here to be no more than a bad memory now.

Another factor working in favor of better coordination among the different army corps is the fact that the regular army's hierarchy has been ruthlessly purged and now scarcely resembles that which existed in the first few months of the revolution. It is true that there are officers nostalgic for the former regime, and everyone admits it, but they seem to have been isolated in their respective corps by the adroit promotion of individuals loyal to the government. The sociological origin of the recruits also differs scarcely at all from that of the pasdarans, and this excludes from the start any disagreeable surprises for the authorities in Tehran.

Paradoxically, the religious groups in Tehran seem to distrust the pasdarans, who are more receptive to rival political ideologies, and they recently appointed

half a dozen members of the clergy to the Higher Council of the Guardians of the Revolution. Colonel Shirazi, commander in chief of ground forces, who was a captain just after the revolution and who, according to public rumor, was the real victor at Dezful, is the very prototype of the young officer loyal to the Islamic regime. He participated ruthlessly in the war against the Kurdish underground and is said to be an ardent supporter of the idea of regrouping the various military forces into a "homogeneous army" whose chief framework would consist mainly of pasdarans. That idea seems to have been rejected by both the military hierarchy and the clergy. The clergy fear the establishment of a unified army that might be tempted at some point to undertake a Bonapartist venture.

#### Tehran's Peace Conditions

It might be thought that the victory at Dezful would contribute to a relaxation of the conditions set by Tehran for a negotiated peace with Baghdad. Not at all. Official spokesmen repeat all day long: "Our cause is just, and only those afflicted with political blindness can say that we are the aggressors." Even allowing, however, for a measure of propaganda in certain statements calling on the "valiant troops of Islam" to pursue the enemy "all the way to Karbala"--that is, beyond Baghdad--the successes have led to a certain stiffening of attitude that contrasts with the more moderate peace conditions now being set by the enemy. Iraq no longer talks about the independence of Kuzistan or about the return to the Arab nation of the three small islands in the Strait of Hormuz. It even seems willing to pay Iran war damages with financial help from the Gulf countries.

The Iranian leaders, on the other hand, have added a fourth condition to their three immutable conditions (unconditional withdrawal, the payment of war indemnities, and the establishment of a commission to determine responsibility for the conflict). That fourth condition also appears unlikely to be acceptable to Baghad: it calls for the return to Iraq of the 100,000 Shiites expelled since the start of hostilities. Most of those Iraqis have been indoctrinated in an Islamic and revolutionary direction during their stay in the refugee camps, and Iraqi authorities have no desire to see them back in Iraq.

Despite the climate of euphoria prevailing in Tehran, some circles close to the regime--and this includes the Communists--are concerned about the stalemate in negotiations and are asking that everything possible be done to "put an end to a war whose continuation can only serve the imperialists and the Americans and harm the Iranian revolution." They emphasize, however, that "the Iraqi aggressors must take the first step" and that "Tehran must make no concessions." Growing popular discontent over economic difficulties could lessen Iranian intransigence, however. A quick visit to Tehran's business districts is all it takes to see the long lines that form every morning in front of certain food stores.

With the exception of fruit and vegetables, the price of which has almost tripled, most food staples are rationed. Distribution seems equitable, since every family is entitled to the ration cards distributed in the neighborhood mosques. But one must still find a store with supplies. Lacking that--and

this is where the shoe pinches--one is forced to turn to the black market, where almost anything can be had if one is willing to pay the price. As one example, a kilogram of meat, which sold for 150 rials\* at the start of the revolution, now costs 400 or 500 rials with a ration card. It must also be pointed out that each family is entitled to only about 1 kilogram every 10 days. If the family turns to the black market, it will pay 1,600 rials per kilogram, or 10 times as much as 3 years ago. The same is true of eggs, milk products--which are becoming increasingly scarce--sugar, tea and coffee, rice, and so on. Automobile owners, who are entitled to only 40 liters of fuel per month--at a cost of 40 rials per liter of premium gasoline--can obtain as much as they want on the black market by paying twice as much.

#### Lunar Landscape

Popular discontent is also increased by unemployment (an estimated 4 million are out of work). And the absence of capital goods and raw materials due to the shortage of foreign exchange has practically paralyzed housing construction in Tehran, which for nearly 3 years has been dotted with the concrete carcasses of unfinished buildings. The huge dormitory town of Ekpatan at the edge of Mehrabad Airport still presents a lunar landscape and is dotted with innumerable yellow cranes which seem to be awaiting in vain the order to resume their work.

The money now being spent on the war with Iraq will not solve the problem. To make ends meet, Tehran is said to have recently sold 150 tons of gold in London. It also dropped the price of its crude oil by \$4 per barrel to facilitate the barter operations that may help it obtain indispensable food staples and equipment. Several agreements of that kind were recently signed with Italy, Uruguay, Romania, Pakistan, and Turkey, despite sharp criticism by the newspapers of any trade with the two last-named countries, which are considered "reactionary."

Wartime necessities seem to have strengthened the pragmatism of the Islamic authorities. They now find themselves faced with the traditional choice between guns and butter. For the moment, they appear able to cope with the situation by holding a stumbling economy at arm's length while launching a new offensive on the Iraqi front in the expectation that they will win a decisive victory.

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\* 1 franc = 13.20 rials at the official rate.

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CSO: 4619/98

BAKHTIAR GROUP BLAMES TUDEH FOR SHARI'ATMADARI PLOT

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 6 May 82 pp 6-7

[Text] The National Iranian Resistance Movement, the opposition group led by Shahpour Bakhtiar, has declared that the Moscow-backed Tudeh party had a leading part in the series of events which culminated in the recent open attack on Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, and his subsequent confinement.

According to NEHZAT, regarded as an official organ of the movement, the Tudeh decided to exploit the current leadership crisis in Iran to confuse public opinion, to move its own trusted agents further up the ladder of the administration and to further isolate nationalist and centrist forces. The whole episode, it argues, favours the gradual drive by the Tudeh to consolidate its hold on the mullahcracy.

NEHZAT refers to the fact that former foreign minister Sadegh Qotbzadeh is closely identified with Khomeyni and his regime, and that his rudeness and arrogance had so antagonised the people that his arrest by the mullahs was bound to make ordinary people happy. They assumed that the "thugs" were fighting among themselves and remained indifferent.

However, this public indifference was exactly what the Tudeh was trying to create so that when the next stage--that of striking at a highly respected figure like Shariat-Madari--arrives the public, lulled into indifference, finds it difficult to react.

In this way the Tudeh was able to deal a heavy blow at a strong bastion of religious opposition to communism, while also strengthening the Marxist-oriented faction of the clergy. At the same time the Tudeh was able to demand political concessions from Khomeyni, who must repay the party for its support in the tough job (for Khomeyni) of eliminating Shariat-Madari, the paper said.

Finally, the episode gives an opportunity to Tudeh to encourage the Khomeyni gang to implicate every important opponent of communism in a fabricated plot and then to knock them out one by one. Already all opposition groups were said to be implicated in this imaginary plot, the paper pointed out.

The clandestine Radio Iran, which also reflects policies of Dr Bakhtiar, has said that hanging judge Khalkhali had a meeting with top Tudeh leaders at the

house of Maryam Kianouri, wife of the Tudeh boss, to coordinate the activities of the IRP thugs with Tudeh activists against Shariat-Madari.

Other opposition groups have also claimed Tudeh collaboration with the regime in masterminding the plot against Shariat-Madari. Since the summer of 1979 Tudeh party publications had continued a relentless campaign against Shariat-Madari and his Muslim People's Party, it is pointed out. In fact, the assertion that one major obstacle to the spread of communism must be found in the institution of Islam applies to the kind of Islam which Shariat-Madari advocates and not the brand of Islam being propagated by Khomeyni, they say.

Because the latest plot against Shariat-Madari was so clearly a boost for Tudeh party followers, many opponents of Khomeyni have now started to warn that the West should not be fooled by reports that the Khomeyni regime is weeding out Tudeh elements from its administration.

The National Front in Exile, a publication following the line of the nationalist movement of the oil nationalisation era, maintains that there are so many similarities between the Khomeyni group and the Tudeh party that for all practical intents and purposes the two are one and the same thing. Both are totalitarian, anti-Western, repressive and monopolistic, it said. Obviously Khomeyni is not as obedient to Moscow as a government headed by Tudeh boss Kianouri would be. But given Iranians' historical dislike of Russians, it is remarkable how Khomeyni has managed to spare the Soviet Union in his frenzied xenophobia, and focus all his hatred on the United States.

CSO: 4600/477

FULL SIGNIFICANCE OF SHARI'AT MADARI CASE EXPLAINED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 69, 29 Apr 82 pp 3-4

[Text] The intensity of the campaign mounted by the radical regime in Tehran against Ayatollah Kazem Shari'at Madari has surprised many non-Iranians, who had imagined the religious leader's passive attitude to a regime he disapproved of meant he was not prepared to fight. These people do not understand the authority that the elderly ayatollah still has with a vast number of devout Iranians, and Shari'at Madari's refusal to give the regime his stamp of legitimacy has made him a threat in the event of the Iranian people really becoming dissatisfied with their lot under Khomeyni.

The ayatollah has said publicly that an Islamic regime of the type envisaged by Iran's rulers is impossible to set up. The clergy's role, he says, is to guide and they should only act when there is a political vacuum--and only then as a last resort.

He has characterised the present regime as both "un-Islamic and anti-Islamic in many ways." For one thing, he said, the constitution is un-Islamic and the way it was put up for referendum, the manner in which it was drawn up and declared approved by the nation, was itself un-Islamic. The revolutionary courts are also un-Islamic, Shari'at Madari has said, even in the light of the most elementary norms set by Islam. The rulings on how to choose a judge, how to obtain witnesses and how to manage a trial were not adhered to by Iran's "Islamic" courts.

The practice of confiscating people's property is also un-Islamic by any standards, Shari'at Madari has said, and there is nothing in Islamic law which permits any authority to confiscate people's property or deny them access to it under any pretext. If the property rightfully belongs to an individual then under no circumstances can this access be a matter for judgment. In many instances property has been confiscated on the grounds that its owners were corrupt, but a person's proven corruption did not extend to allowing seizure of his property unless it was obtained by corrupt means.

Shari'at Madari has also stated publicly that his interpretation of the velayat-e-faghikh (supreme religious authority) is that the ulema (the priesthood) had, as a congregation the duty to help the people to form a legitimate government if and when there was a vacuum of authority. That government should be a representative government and not a theocracy because the task of

governing does not necessarily belong to the clergy. His considered opinion, openly stated, is that the clergy are better advised not to govern, because in the absence of the infallible person any individual was liable to misuse power, either because of ignorance or because of personal weakness, if no checks or balances were provided. This applied in Iran today.

Shari'at Madari has advised the clergy not to govern because to do so was an act of commission and in an act of commission mistakes could be made. If these were made in the name of religion then the mistakes would inevitably be attributed to religion. He has denounced the article of the constitution which vests all manner of authority and power in the person of the faghih, with no means of making this person accountable.

Kazem Shari'at Madari has been recognised as a theological authority and as a source of guidance and interpreter of the holy scriptures for at least a quarter of a century. Long before Khomeyni, in fact, he was regarded as a theologian of significance. Ironically, Shari'at Madari used his authority and position to help save Khomeyni's life when he was faced with the probability of being executed by the Shah's regime after organising violence and opposition to the regime nearly 20 years ago.

Shari'at Madari's position as marja taghlid (authoritative source of interpretation and guidance) came about by the universal acclaim of Shias all over the world. His well-known treatise on Shi'ite theology is still regarded as the only generally acceptable document of its kind since the treatise of the previous undisputed marja taghlid, Ayatollah Boroujerdi. Shari'at Madari's book is used as texts, while Khomeyni's are not. Ironically, too, it was Boroujerdi who is widely reported as having told the fiery Khomeyni prophetically many years ago, "If ever you get power the streets of Tehran will run with blood!"

CSO: 4600/478

#### KHALKHALI GUARDS RUN INTO TROUBLE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 6 May 82 pp 8-9

[Text] A group of revolutionary guards who were formerly under the command of hanging judge Sadegh Khalkhali were recently placed under arrest for allegedly plotting to assassinate Prime Minister Hossein Musavi, reports from Tehran indicated last week. However, after intervention by Khomeyni's son, Ahmad, the guards were released and transferred to Qom.

Khalkhali, who at present sits in the Majlis as a deputy from Qom, was a self-proclaimed judge during the early months of the revolution, travelling around the country in the company of several dozen armed men, organising impromptu trials at street corners, and in schools and confiscated houses to send hundreds to their deaths. Later when public outcry mounted against his excesses, Khomeyni made a speech giving his personal blessing to his acts.

In early 1980, the then president Bani-Sadr issued a presidential decree appointing Khalkhali as the chief judge in the fight against drug smugglers. In this capacity he executed some 600 people, including 42 inmates of Qasr prison in Tehran who were already sentenced by civil courts to prison terms.

When Khalkhali was declared a Majlis deputy in 1980, he refused to give up his judicial position or to release his army of revolutionary guards. But last year, at the behest of Qom theologians, he finally decided to give up dispensing justice and subsequently had to agree to the transfer of many of his guardsmen to other duties.

The guardsmen claimed, however, that they owed loyalty to Khalkhali personally. An attempt to send some of them to Khuzestan failed, so they were sent to serve as security agents under the Central Committee of Islamic Guidance. As such they were given jobs such as searching houses of suspected enemies of the regime.

It is not known how the guards came to be implicated in what seems to be an implausible allegation of a plot to kill Musavi, who is a comparatively insignificant functionary in the mullahocracy. Nor is it known why Ayatollah Meshkini, personal representative of Khomeyni in Qom, used his influence to save them from confinement.

News of their arrest leaked out when they were sent under guard to Qom and agents called at the house of one of them to collect his belongings. It was then that the neighbours learned of the group's arrest and charges against them.

Sources inside Iran believe that the episode is one more manifestation of the power struggle going on among the mullahs of the Khomeyni camp prior to the finalisation of his succession problem. It may mean that the Islamic Republican party faction is trying to intimidate the Fedayeen-e-Islam faction (Islamic Brotherhood) to whom Khalkhali claims to belong.

However, the problem has been complicated by a statement from revolutionary courts prosecutor Mohammadi-Gailani, himself a member of the Fedayeen-e-Islam, who has asserted that the group is no longer active as a separate entity and that in any case Khalkhali has never belonged to it. The revolutionary courts chief judge Mussavi-Tabrizi has on occasions said that no authority other than judges carrying assignments from him was any longer competent to interfere in judicial tasks. This was taken to mean that Khalkhali's guards are no longer allowed to search houses, arrest people and confiscate property.

Whether the latest incident involving Khalkhali's guards is an isolated affair or part of a protracted power tussle will be known when arrangements for an experts' assembly to decide Khomeyni's successor are made public.

CSO: 4600/477

ARMY'S POSSIBLE ROLES IN POLITICAL FUTURE EXAMINED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 69, 29 Apr 82 pp 5-8

[Text] Western correspondents and the leader writer of the LONDON TIMES seem to have been unduly impressed and illogically alarmed by the success of the Iranian army during the recent battle west of Dezful and Shush. Iran's ruling mullahs have meanwhile added to the confusion by their contradictory statements on peace initiatives.

Western correspondents seem to have assumed that the mullahs have managed to create an efficient fighting machine capable of penetrating into Iraqi territory to force a change of regime in Iraq. They then have assumed that the capability to create such an army can be extended into political capability to create a similar theocratic-cum-anti-Western regime in Iraq which could effectively control the Persian Gulf. It would bring smaller oil shaikhdoms into its orbit and expand its influence to Syria and perhaps to Jordan. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia and Egypt might be drawn into the melee, with super-power involvement and all that.

It is quite possible that the Iranian army will come up with yet another victory, and Iraqi president Saddam Hussein might lose his hold on power. But even such an eventuality does not make Iran a supreme political and military power with the mullahs in power; nor does a change of ruler in Iraq necessarily mean an Islamic revolutionary regime.

Now let us analyse Iran's military capability and the role of the mullahs in creating it. Before the revolution Iran was already a modern, military power boasting a strong air force and very good staff officers. But it was a professional and apolitical fighting machine which made it different from the politicised Arab armies. Also, unlike Arab armies it did not have a well-defined enemy like the Israelis and its combat experience was limited to some rounds of fighting in Oman.

The mullahs maintain, however, that the army under the Shah had the most sophisticated weapons but lacked morale. The other critics of the Shah add that the top brass of the army was corrupt and given to an easy life. The way the army capitulated to Khomeyni is often taken to mean that it was a weak and demoralised force incapable of fighting.

This is not true. The Iranian army was not trained to fight terrorists and street mobs. Such tasks were given to other security forces. During the last 20 years the task of dealing with groups of dissident tribesmen, for example, was given to the gendarmerie. It was one of the greatest mistakes of the Shah in the last quarter of 1978 to bring the army onto the streets. Indeed if the Shah wanted to fight street mobs effectively, and was prepared to spill blood, which he was not, the commando units of the police could well have done it. But the Shah brought conscript troops and highly professional officers to the streets to face schoolchildren and girls clad in Islamic veils. It was not the kind of battlefield about which they had learned in their training and they were under instruction not to shoot at the demonstrators.

Even then, as one observer noted, it was a proud moment up until the fateful day when the army was ordered to return to barracks to see the composure and patience of the troops on the streets on those bleak wintry days. When the Shah's last chief of staff, General Gharabaghi, ordered the soldiers to leave the streets, it was a great blow to their morale. What happened has not yet been revealed but ostensibly the army was to withdraw and let the civilians sort things out. But suddenly armed bands were led to the army barracks to hunt down and shoot the soldiers and officers who were ordered to lay down their arms.

Since then Khomeyni has repeatedly said that had the army decided to shoot it out with the so-called revolutionaries it could have wiped them out in a matter of hours. So it is a fallacy to say that a band of terrorists and schoolboys led by 2,000 or so of Rajavi's militia and those of now assassinated gunman Mostafa Chamran defeated the mighty Iranian army. What happened was a betrayal of the troops which led to disintegration of the army.

When the Iraqis attacked Iran the army, purged, beaten, humiliated and dis-organised by civilian overlords whom it was trained to obey, was not deployed in the right positions to stop the enemy, even had it been able. And for a long time it was frustrated by the civilian administrators and their favouring of incompetent commanders. It was only when President Bani-Sadr was removed and the fighting was left to the professionals that it was able to show some efficiency.

Yet military observers say that the Iranians' performance is far from what it once might have been. "We are fighting a basically inferior army commanded by retarded officers," one officer was quoted as saying when the Abadan siege was broken. The Iraqi army, plagued by politics and 25 years of purges, was always regarded by Iranian officers to be inferior to them man to man. So it is no big deal to score a couple of victories over an Iraqi army which has never distinguished itself in battle either with Israelis or the Kurdish rebels. Already on two occasions in 1972 and 1973 small units of the Iranian army had gained combat experience against Iraqis and had rated their capability as very low.

So it is wrong to say that the mullahs have created a modern and efficient army. If some of the foreign correspondents had looked up their files they would simply have written that despite the negative influence of the mullahs, the Iranian army was able to perform up to a fraction of its original capability.

It is doubtful whether the mullahs have the political expertise to exploit Iraq's military defeat to gain political advantages. The chances are that the mullahs will do their best to minimise the army's efficiency, high morale and prestige long before it is ready to go into Iraq. The Iranian army must first free Khorramshahr, Mehran, Naft-e-Shah, Khosravi and Qasr-e-Shirin before it is ready to push into Iraqi territory. Indeed, the Iranian army has only two options in taking the war inside enemy territory; either to take Basra or Khaneghin. In each case it faces serious obstacles.

The army remains as a legacy of Iran's pre-revolutionary secular regime and what efficiency it has been able to muster after initial setbacks is despite and not because of the mullahs. And the question of Islam providing a morale-boosting dimension is not true because even Khomeyni himself has had to appeal to the soldiers' sense of patriotism rather than their readiness to be martyrs. Indeed, the martyr syndrome applies only to some groups of irregular forces but its appeal wears off very quickly as is evidenced in the case of more experienced and seasoned revolutionary guards who shun the battlefields and prefer to stay in the hinterland to act as the strong arm of the mullahs against the civil population.

As long ago as April 1980, the then prosecutor-general of the revolutionary courts, assassinated mullah Ali Qoddusi, admitted in a television interview that the revolutionary guards were at their most enthusiastic when ordered to confiscate people's property. He said guards sat around the committee rooms and were even reluctant to go on patrols; but when there is an order for arresting someone, with accompanying permission to confiscate his property, they all jumped at the chance. This is a far cry from voluntary desire to be killed for Islam. The martyr syndrome does exist but it has been blown up out of proportion.

Thus, while the mullahs may have let the army regain part of its former efficiency and while the recent battle successes and experiences may have created a powerful fighting machine for the country, it is doubtful whether it could easily be put at the disposal of the mullahs for their cynical manipulation for political ends. In other words, the army will not let itself be turned into a docile and subservient instrument for the mullahs to drive into Iraq to topple the secular regime and to help an Iraqi version of Khomeyni take over.

In the past the army, as well as the police and gendarmes, has repeatedly made it known that they are not prepared to fight against the mullahs' domestic enemies or do dirty jobs for them. Such dirty work must be done by the beneficiaries of Khomeyni's Islam.

Khomeyni himself is well aware of the dangers of dragging the army into politics: he has on several occasions warned army personnel not to join political parties. Most recent on the Army Day, April 18, he said they should not join the most Islamic of the republican parties either, which was a clear indication that they must not even join the Islamic Republican Party.

In any case the mullahs are not likely to use the army for political ends; they rely on the revolutionary guards and their network of mosque-controlled

informers. So the argument that the army's recent victories will enhance the position of the mullahs and extend their influence beyond Iran's borders just does not stand up.

Saddam Hussain's regime may suffer setbacks and in turn the Iranian mullahs may like to exploit them. But any such setback will be seen not as a victory for the mullahs but as the inherent weakness of the Iraqi regime. What it is important to realise is whether or not Saddam Hussein's successors would inevitably be theocrats. This is unlikely; even Khomeyni does not fully entertain such a hope.

The Arabs, unlike the Iranians, have very recent experience of the drawbacks and destructive effects of theocratic regimes so they cannot be fooled as easily as Khomeyni and his former allies like Bazargan succeeded in fooling Iranians. Few Arabs are likely to have forgotten Imam Yahya's theocracy in the Yemen or Sultan Said's in Oman, or only 50 years ago the Ottoman caliphate in most of the Arab world. Moreover, the Arab countries are populated by peoples adhering to many sects of Islam, while their non-Muslim, mainly Christian, communities are very strong. In Iraq and Egypt the Christians are indigenous people and not ethnic minorities like Armenians in Iran.

All these factors mitigate against rise of theocratic regimes in Iraq, Jordan and other sophisticated parts of the Arab world while less advanced parts are already ruled by emirs who observe strict Islamic rules. Analogies with Iran are therefore deceptive. That is why nationalism has come to play a leading role in the Arab world. The mullahs' closest allies in the Arab world are all secular regimes, like Syria, Algeria and South Yemen; in Libya, although its ruler is pretending to be a puritanical Muslim, his regime is by no means theocratic.

The fears raised by western correspondents that with their recent military victory the mullahs may be on the brink of effecting radical changes in the Middle East seem to be farfetched.

But the Irano-Iraq war will have some profound impact on the region in due course. The main impact may well be in Iran where already people are showing signs of impatience because of the war dragging on. Recent victories remind the people that had it not been for Khomeyni there would not have been an initial victory for the Iraqis and the war would not have lasted so long.

If anything the emergence of the army as a strong force will pose great problems for the mullahs. They lack the experience and the sophistication to keep a strong and united army under their control. Already the same junior officers who have received promotion from Khomeyni laugh at the suggestion that this old preacher is their commander-in-chief. They tolerate him for the time being because he has been made into a legend for the simple people. The sight of another mullah, say Montazeri or Khamene'i, as commander-in-chief, will be even more grotesque. And the magic of Islam cannot keep the professional soldiers under control. Any attempt at systematic purges will also antagonise the army, making the officer corps feel insecure. The recent victories may well herald the beginning of a series of problems for the mullahs, who might have to give the army a share in power. Indeed, there might be a change in the regime in Baghdad because of the war, but at the same time there is no guarantee that it will be what Khomeyni expects; he may not be around to see it anyway.

CLANDESTINE RADIO LASHES OUT AT MONTAZERI'S DIRECTIVE

GF181828 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT  
18 May 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri, the future hope of the oppressed of the world, said once again that Iran must export its revolution to the nations of the world. He has advised the Revolution Guards to marry the widows of martyred armed forces personnel. We have a commentary for you on this topic by the Free Voice of Iran commentator:

He writes: Following the exhortations of Khomeyni on the marriage of the young followers of the imam's line and guards with the spouses of the armed forces personnel who have been martyred on the warfront, the imbecile mullah of the so-called Islamic regime, Sheykh Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri, did not want to be left behind in mouthing the utterances of the imam without a nation and told a group of guards in Qom that they should go and wed the widows of the martyrs. He said that if they already had wives they could take them as common law wives or "sigheh" [a Shi'ite concept of legalized, temporary concubinage].

The spurious imam had also uttered this ludicrous piece of advice, but these prophetlike utterances of the fake imam encountered strong reaction from the officers and noble and patriotic personnel of the Iranian armed forces, some of whom presented their resignations to the supreme commander of the armed forces. They did not want their spouses to be forced into wedlock with militant Revolution Guards whose hands are stained with the blood of the nation and the armed forces or their children to be subjected to the mercy of the lewd scoundrels. This was exactly what was expected of the noble armed forces of Iran.

The fact is that in Khomeyni's regime, things have reached the point where the mullahs issue orders regarding the most private aspects of the people's personal lives and interfere in the personal affairs of the boudoirs and bedchambers of the people. Do the idiotic clergymen and this supreme commander of the armed forces have no sense of shame or embarrassment whatsoever? Khomeyni's and Montazeri's shamelessness has reached such bounds that in order to provide greater facilities to the Revolution Guard non-entities, they have undertaken to become the pimps of the chaste womenfolk

whom they order to marry the guards. Are the salaries and fringe benefits of 10,000-12,000 tumans, free of very low-priced foodstuffs and consumer goods not enough for these parasites and fungi of society who unfortunately sport the titles of the guards of Islam or the revolution that Khomeyni and Montazeri now present them with the young women of Iran's society? Why do not Khomeyni and Montazeri present them with members of their own families instead of with others' relatives? Is the promulgation of such decrees Islamic?

Mr Khomeyni at the time of his abominable advent in Iran said: The status of women in Islam is so elevated that all the women of the world will exclaim, "If only we were Muslims!" Yet Khomeyni's first step was to annul the family protection law and the prohibition against concubinage. How long will this degradation and retrogression have to be endured? Everything has been lost under the inauspicious shadow of the famine-like government of the mullahs. The elite of Iran's progeny, the bravest of army officers have fallen into dust and blood in the deserts and [words indistinct] the nation has been sacrificed for the mullahs' lust for power.

The calamities that have befallen us and our nation have deprived the people of the power of endurance, and our (?noble) compatriots are on the lookout for an opportunity to rise and throw the shameless and debauched regime into the garbage can they deserve. The true history, the pure and chaste history of the land of Iran, will honor this uprising and Khomeyni and Montazeri and their minions and quislings will meet their proper fate. The honor that the armed forces of Iran and the Iranian nation will earn in history for breaking the shackles of the domination of the turbaned touts is what you, our dear compatriots, and you, our dear brothers in the armed forces must prepare for.

CSO: 4640/297

CLERGY REPORTED 'VISITING' FRONT AFTER CRITICISM

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 6 May 82 pp 2-3

[Text] Observers noted that, in its broadcasts on the offensive on the war front, the Tehran regime stressed that three prominent clergymen close to Khomeyni in Meshkini, Sadoughi and Jannati, had been visiting the battlefield. This appeared to be a response to criticisms after the last offensive, in which large numbers of young people died, that the mullahs stayed in safety while they urged the young to martyr themselves. Whether the trio actually visited the front is not known.

Meanwhile Iraq announced that it has asked the International Red Cross to repatriate Iranian children it claimed had been captured at the front. This also seemed a response to the reports of deep concern inside Iran over the loss of untrained young people in the war areas. Majlis Speaker Hashem Rafasanjani stressed in Tehran on Tuesday that the latest offensive was carefully planned to minimise casualties. Though this might have been seen by some people as a reflection of the fact that the offensive had come to a halt unexpectedly soon, many also saw it as a sign of new sensitivity towards the public attitude to the heavy casualty rate in the war. The media this time did not play up in its usual fashion the stories of teenage boys willingly going to their deaths to please the "Imam."

In fact, it is thought that the slaughter at the front at the end of March has deterred youngsters from rushing forward to offer themselves for service. It appears to have served as a cold douche on their fervour.

Two other reasons have also been put forward by observers in Tehran for the fact that this latest offensive seems to have been carried out without the support of large numbers of the irregular forces. One is that many revolutionary guards were brought back into Tehran when unrest grew over the threat to Ayatollah Shariat-Madari. Many bazaar shops remained closed and a decision appeared to have been made to take some firm action to deter growing opposition rumblings. The attacks on the Mojahedin hideouts are seen as a result of this.

Another reason put forward for the absence of the guards and militia from the battle around Khorramshahr is that the guards chief Mohsen Rezai is reportedly on bad terms with the professional military chiefs. Rezai, it is said, has

demanded the retirement of a dozen or so senior officers since the announcement of the involvement of active military personnel in the recent alleged coup.

Radio Iran, an opposition radio station run by the National Iranian Resistance Movement of Shahpour Bakhtiar, reported last weekend that present military chief of staff General Zahirnejad is under criticism and may face possible removal because of his differences with Rezai.

CSO: 4600/477

REASON FOR LACK OF CRITICISM OF KHOMEYNI BY CLERGY EXAMINED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 6 May 82 pp 4-6

[Text] Can Khomeyni be declared unfit to act as an authoritative theologian by any top religious authority? The question arises because of mounting criticism of Khomeyni and his government by an ever-growing body of theologians in Iran who maintain that the theocratic authorities are embarking on the most deplorable acts in the name of Islam.

Moreover, it is often said of Khomeyni that he constantly tells lies, endorses clearly anti-Islamic activities of his underlings and advocates policies and actions which are explicitly forbidden by the holy texts. There is said to be overwhelming evidence of Khomeyni's anti-Islamic deeds and words; yet no theologian of stature has publicly declared him as an apostate. Why?

"I have collected close to 150 excerpts and quotations from Khomeyni which can be held in any court as lies, slander, false pretences, misrepresentation and above all breach of promises," an Iranian student of political affairs told this correspondent. "Some of the false statements made by Khomeyni are so absurd that one may attribute them to his ignorance; but most of his wrong statements are well-thought out lies which he deliberately tells to achieve his mundane political objectives."

One of his most ridiculous statements came in September 1979, when Khomeyni received the sons and daughters of Ayatollah Mahmud Taleghani, who had just died. Taleghani was regarded as the spiritual father of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq and other extreme leftist groups and his sons were known to be diehard marxists who were at that time pressing Khomeyni to give the Mojahedin more freedom and pave the way for introduction of working "Soviets" in the factories. So Khomeyni decided to lecture Taleghani's sons on the shortcomings of the Soviet-style government.

"Let me cite for you a true story about Stalin when he came to Tehran in early 1940s," he said, referring to the Tehran Conference of 1943 when allied leaders Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill met in the Iranian capital.

"As it has been related to me, the leader of the English arrived in a plane and took a taxi to go to his residence," Khomeyni said. "The leader of America did likewise. But Stalin arrived in a very big plane, because he had brought his cow with him in that plane. He brought his cow so that he could drink milk

from his own cow, which he personally supervised as she was milked. So great was his lack of trust in other people. This is the system which creates mistrust and suspicion."

There is no evidence to support the accuracy of this statement. Khomeyni could be taken to task for having said so obvious a lie. In many other statements he has told lies which are malicious and intended to misrepresent facts. More important than all these, he has broken his promises made in public time and again. In Paris he promised to come to Iran to go to his theological school to teach. On arrival in Tehran in February 1979, he said once Bakhtiar's government was gone, a constituent assembly would be elected to decide on the future of the country. But he reneged on his promise, catapulted the nation into an Islamic republic and instead of letting people elect a proper constituent assembly he went along with plans by Bani-Sadr and Beheshti to hold a council of hand-picked mullahs to draw up a theocratic constitution in a manner which is by any yardstick misrepresentation and fraudulent. Finally his own personal endorsement of the so-called students' action to take American diplomats and hold them hostage is a sign of his anti-Islamic actions. There is a surrah in the Quran which states that the holding of hostages is as bad a sin as eating the flesh of your brother.

Yet despite such obvious anti-Islamic acts no senior Muslim theologian in Iran, or abroad, has actually declared Khomeyni as a "Murtad," which means someone who has renounced the faith by word or deed. This is because in Islam it is very difficult to apostasize a senior theologian, especially someone like Khomeyni who controls the powers of a state, such as the armed forces and all the media, and who is shrewd enough to decorate his false statements with such phrases as "I have been told," or "the way I have been given to understand." By means of such phrases Khomeyni shifts the eventual objection to his statements onto unnamed informants. For instance, when he talked of Stalin's cow he did not say that he was personally a witness; rather, he said that the story was communicated to him by someone else, who should have had responsibility for its accuracy.

Even then, a forceful theologian can object to Khomeyni because he must not relate stories which are related to him by suspect sources. Moreover, in many other cases Khomeyni can be held responsible for slander, double talk and other sins. Why then have Khomeyni and his group of gunslinging unholy followers been able to commit so many crimes in the name of Islam and get away with them so easily?

One explanation is that there is no well-organised church among the Shi-ites, or indeed other sects of Islam. Khomeyni may like to talk his head off about the privileged position of the clergy, but he is wrong because there is no such institution as a clergy in Islam. The prophet himself was an ordinary merchant. His venerated successors, known as the Four Caliphs, were people of various vocations who were elected by popular acclaim to succeed the prophet as his temporal heir. In this respect Islam is different from Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Christianity, which recognises a well-organised body of clergy. That is why Khomeyni's drive for a theocracy is so out of place in Iran.

So because the Shi'ite clergy lacks an organised and as such an official status, the theologians are reluctant to resort to such means as excommunication to deal with an unruly or wayward person. In the past the Shi'ite clergy were simply on the periphery of the political mainstream, often remaining aloof from ordinary affairs. Their main task used to be "legitimisation" of the ruling body. In this way the clergy could claim credit for the government's good deeds but would not be accountable for its bad deeds. And if anybody charged the clergy for their silence against the "blatant" anti-Islamic deeds of any ruler, they would say in their defence that they were simply resorting to the practice of "taghieh," which means "compliance without having conviction."

However, at times some mullahs who had influence among the masses used to object to some specific act of a ruling body or king and arouse the people against the rulers. In such cases the rulers or kings would either enlist the support of friendly mullahs and oppose the disobedient and rebellious mullah or try to accommodate him to persuade him to abandon his campaign.

In return for their compliance, the mullahs usually had their own privileges and sinecures. They would monopolise judicial positions, educational institutions and benefits from religious donations, endowments and trusts. Thus the mullahs were part of the ruling class, though the rulers were laymen and strictly speaking there was no theocracy.

The constitutional movement of 1904 and 1905 was in fact aimed at curbing not only the powers of an absolute monarch but also the privileges of the clergy. But when in 1906 Iran's first constitution was written certain concessions were made to the clergy--for instance, it was written in the constitution that propagating and practicing communistic ideas is forbidden. Also 12 senior clergymen were to supervise acts of parliament to make sure that they complied with Islam's spirit.

Under the constitutional regime the powers and domain of the clergy rapidly declined; so did their social status. In fact, the mullahs have always been scorned by sophisticated Iranians and the rich Persian literature is full of humorous and pointed criticism of mullahs. Khayyam and Hafez are good examples. So when the clergy lost its power, its status dropped even more rapidly. Sons of wealthy or well-educated clergymen no longer aspired to follow in the footsteps of their fathers; theological schools (Madrassa) became a place for poor village boys to have a chance to study.

All these developments contributed to disorganisation of the clerical institution so much so that today bona fide theologians lack the means and the power to confront Khomeyni's claim to be the leader of all Muslims and the claim of his government to the Islamic label.

Khomeyni himself was an exception to the general rule in the world of Shi'ite clergy. He showed an interest in politics as early as 1941 and was a member of the Iranian version of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Fedayeen-e-Islam, which were regarded as heretics. But Khomeyni did not reveal his true personality until much later in 1960. He rose to power through the assistance of such

leftist terrorist groups as the Mojahedin and the Fedayeen-e-Khalq although the remnants of the Fedayeen-e-Islam, who now rule Iran, were instrumental in consolidating his power.

The mainstream of the Shi'ite clerical establishment, which refrained from helping Khomeyni in 1960, somehow gave him tacit approval in 1978. Once he was in the saddle Khomeyni combined his claim to be a religious leader with utilising the machinery of government to set himself up as a ruling pope or theocrat. And on several occasions he ruthlessly killed clerics who dared to call him a heretic.

Despite all his shrewdness Khomeyni is fast losing his esteem as a spiritual leader. He is often referred to by the public as the imposter, the false pretender or as Zohak, a mythological tyrant in Persian epic literature.

Some members of the opposition groups have tried to encourage bona fide clerics to take advantage of popular hatred for Khomeyni and to declare him a heretic. But again the bona fide mullahs, raised in conservative circumstances, are reluctant to do so.

Meanwhile, Khomeyni resorts to extremely violent and unorthodox methods to deal with his adversaries, whether laity or clergy. The way Khomeyni and his henchmen struck at Ayatollah Shariat-Madari underlines the fact that Khomeyni stops at nothing to crush his opponents, while theologians like Shariat-Madari invariably shy away from brinkmanship. It is, therefore, not surprising to see Khomeyni abuse Islam so openly and cynically and yet get away with it.

Leading political opponents of Khomeyni simply regard him as a master criminal in clerical garb and have already condemned him as such. But his clerical opponents might soon desperately seek ways of alienating Khomeyni and his regime from Islam if they are to retain spiritual authority.

Already Khomeyni has come to be regarded as the most tyrannical, most blood-thirsty and destructive ruler in Iran's long history. He clings to power simply by brute force and not by virtue of any spiritual hold. And since he relies largely on the support of society's dropouts his regime seems bound to fall.

What theologians like Shariat-Madari fear is that the fall of the Khomeyni regime may bring to the fore a fanatical anti-Islamic feeling. To most secularists this is a welcome prospect. They believe that an anti-Islamic mood will also mean popular opposition to communism because in its implications on people's everyday life Khomeyni's Islamic totalitarianism looks as bad as Stalin's communist totalitarianism--long a spectre that disturbed the neighbouring Iranian people.

CSO: 4600/477

VARIOUS ECONOMIC INNOVATIONS ANNOUNCED

Diesels Converted to Gas

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 6 May 82 p 2

[Interview with Savad Kuhi, head of design, research division, date and place not given]

[Text]

TEHRAN, May 5 (IRNA) — The committed Muslim experts of the Iran National Automobile Assembly plant succeeded in changing the fuel of M-360 engines from diesel to gas. This was accomplished in order to make better use of the large amount of gas reserves in Iran and to prevent air pollution, said Savad Kuhi, the Head of the Design and Research Division and inventor of the engine, to Kayhan.

Referring to the engine, Savad Kuhi said that its fuel usage would be 50% less than diesel. He added that the designers of the Iran National plant have invented a special instrument which has been produced for the first time in Iran for measuring the amount of motor power. After 15 years of relations with the industrial coun-

tries the plant had not been able to measure the power of motors being delivered to Iran by other countries, said Savad Kuhi, who expressed his pleasure on the invention of the instrument.

The instrument would work up to 10,000 revolutions per minute (RPM) and it could brake with 80 horse-power added Savad Kuhi. He added that it worked with water and it did not need any imported spare part.

On adapting the Peugeot motor engines for the Peykan car Savad Kuhi said that after various tests they had not found the engine suitable for the car and instead they would use the engine of the Japanese Galant for Pekyan. Studies on it had been started by Iranian experts of the plant, he concluded.

Airbuses Received

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 6 May 82 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN, May 5 (IRNA) — The fourth airbus was officially delivered to Iran in a ceremony this morning at Mehrabad Airport. Six airbuses have been purchased from Airbus Industries following the Iranian Aviation Authority's policy to increase

communication domestically according to the company's managing director Mohammad Baqerian. The remaining two airbuses will be delivered one at the end of the current month and the other by the end of 1982.

The airbuses with a capacity of

284 passengers and very fuel efficient will be used for domestic flights in a bid to increase communication between provincial towns. Iran has about 20 provincial airports and two international airports.

Iran Air makes 106 domestic flights and 15 international flights weekly. Since October 23rd, 1981 Iran Air has flown about 2,230,000 passengers, about 980,000 passengers in domestic flights and the rest to overseas

destinations, using about 70 percent of the payload of the company aircraft.

During the same period the company has carried about 89,000 tons of cargo, 81,000 tons to domestic destinations and the rest to overseas. Iran Air has also carried about 200,000 kgs of mail to local destinations and another 2 million kgs. of mail and parcel post overseas. The company is to overhaul its own 707's in Iran early next year (April 1983).

### Transportation Projects

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 6 May 82 p 2

[Interview with Mohamad Hadinejad-Hoseinian, minister of roads and transport, date and place not given]

[Text]

TEHRAN, May 5 (IRNA) -- Roads and Transport Minister Brother Nejadhusseinian in an interview with IRNA, outlined Tuesday the functions conducted in the past year as well as the Ministry's plans and goals. Regarding the development of airlines in the country, Nejadhusseinian said that expanding internal and external flights was included in the Ministry's plans. Some flights would be further opened to most spots of the country including Sanandaj-Hamadan (Kurdistan and Bakhtaran Provinces respectively) in the current year, he stated.

During negotiations recently conducted with the officials of some friendly Muslim countries, especially Algeria and Syria, he added, Iran would establish some air routes with those countries. Also, in negotiations conducted with the top-ranking mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the latter was invited to come to Iran to visit Iranian installations and aviation facilities, and to train pilots and navigators.

On the purchase of airplanes, Nejadhusseinian said that the four Air Buses which had been purchased during the ex-regime would be handed over to Iran. What important in this field, he said, is that possessing those Air Buses would be profitable for Iran because their payable price is less

than the current price in the market.

Concerning the Cabinet's programs for expanding the ports and re-building the ports damaged in the Iraqi imposed war, he said that a plan for opening 14 new ports had been prepared and the establishment of 5 ports has so far been put on tender.

He also announced his readiness to implement the decisions made by the committee for re-building the war zones in reviving the ports of Khuninshahr and Abadan.

Asked about railway expansion plans, Nejadhusseinian recalled that by constructing the Kerman-Zahedan railway, western Iran and Pakistan would be connected to each other. With respect to the fundamental needs of the country, it is not planned to electrify the country's railways, he added, but the Tabriz-Jolfa railway would be electrified according to the previous plan, which is already being used now from Tabriz to Sufian. Nejadhusseinian, in this regard remarked that several electric locomotives have so far been purchased by the government.

Comparing road-construction activities before and after the Revolution he said some 18,000 kms of rural roads had been constructed after the Revolution, while prior to that, only 2,000 kms had been built.

## Reconstruction of War Areas

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 9 May 82 p 8

[Interview with Mr Akhondi, member of central council of the construction Jihad, date and place not given]

[Text]

Mr Akhondi, a member of the Central Council of the Construction Jihad in a press interview last week outlined the functions and programs of the Construction Jihad (CJ) in reconstructing the war zones, particularly the rural areas in these regions.

Referring to the general and ultimate goals of the CJ and the present role of the institution with regard to the Iraqi imposed war and the reconstruction of the war torn areas, he stated that the philosophy behind the existence of the CJ was to aid and support the oppressed masses of the society. "This is the main objective of the CJ," said Mr. Akhondi, and he added, "Nonetheless, with the military occupation of some Iranian territories by the invading army of Iraq and following the Imam's order for active participation in the war as a part of our religious duty, the Construction Jihad entered the field of action extensively and seriously."

He went on to say that besides its activities in the field of agriculture, the CJ has mainly focused its efforts in the warfronts. During the victorious operations of Fath-ul Mobin (March 21st, marking the beginning of the new Iranian year) and Bair-ul Moqaddas (Jerusalem), started April 30th, the CJ members played effective roles in the engineering and logistical assignments. He asserted that the CJ members were very successful in properly performing their tasks.

In another part of the interview, Mr. Akhondi stated that during the 19-month-old war imposed more than 1,200 Iranian villages had been raised by the Iraqi aggressors and between 10 to 15 towns of the Islamic land needed serious reconstruction.

"Economic poverty, the low level of the people's social culture, the domination of landlords and

feudatories as well as counter-revolutionary and destructive activities of foreign-aligned groups, were among the difficulties witnessed in some of the country's areas. This is particularly so in the war zones before the outbreak of the imposed war," according to the CJ official.

"Before the war", noted Akhondi, "We wanted to carry out wide development projects in most of the country's regions. Nevertheless, with the start of the Iraqi imposed war, most of our forces were dispatched to the battlefield to take a share in expelling the aggressors from our Islamic homeland." This also necessitated that priority be given to reconstructing the war-stricken areas.

From the very beginning, Akhondi noted, we were thinking of reconstructing the stricken regions. To this end we have already begun (since six months ago) to take basic steps in this regard. Brother Akhondi expressed hope that within the next few days, a council comprising the interior minister, the executive undersecretary of the Interior Ministry and CJ officials will be formed, with the approval of the cabinet, to supervise the executive activities in connection with the liberated areas. Another council will also be formed to coordinate the activities of administrative institutions and Islamic Revolutionary organs, in reconstructing the liberated lands.

Mr. Akhondi added that so far 1,200 villages had been specified for reconstruction.

He went on to say that the troops of Saddam, when fleeing the battle-scenes, had destroyed Iranian villages installations and production centers.

The Construction Jihad, in charge of planning, management and supervision of the projects dealing with the renovation of the war zones, will practically under-

take the reconstruction of ruined villages in these areas. In the provincial cities and capitals, according to the CJ official, relevant institutions will have necessary cooperation with the Construction Jihad.

Mr. Akhondi stressed, however, that in its efforts to implement development and reconstruction projects, the CJ needed the people's financial, technical and spiritual aid and that public mobilization should take place in this regard.

Talking about the implementation of the plans of the Construction Jihad Organization in reconstructing the war zones, Mr. Akhondi said that the war regions would be identified and classified first and then each division would be allocated to specific responsibilities. In the second stage, the afore-mentioned region should be cleared of mines or other explosives and in the third stage, it should be disinfected and cleared and the implementation of hygienic regulations should not be ignored. In the fourth stage the public places should be constructed in accordance with the views of the local inhabitants and their cultural and traditional pat-

terns. In the fifth stage, the arrangements for the running of productive systems needed in the region would be provided and afterwards, they would be utilized.

Mr. Akhondi further added that they would utilize the experiences of other countries such as Syria and Algeria in reconstructing the war-stricken regions.

He again stressed that the construction of the war-stricken regions was not limited to the construction of housing units and that individuals and social groups should contact them before starting their construction.

He continued by saying that the government and Jihad had decided to propose the executive projects and supply the materials needed and to offer financial assistance to the residents of the war-stricken regions, so that the latter would construct the housing units and buildings as they liked.

Mr. Akhondi stated that beside the unsparing assistances of the people and the public mobilization in this human and Islamic affair, a sizeable amount has been allocated for this goal in the current year's budget which will be spent as required in these regions.

CSO: 4600/469

REASON FOR HUGE ANTISUBVERSIVE BUDGET EXPOSED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 69, 29 Apr 82 pp 8-9

[Text] The Khomeyni regime has allocated more than \$2 billion (£1,000 million) to finance subversive activities in other Islamic countries. The disclosure has been made by a Paris-based Persian publication, GHIAME IRAN, which draws on the research work and studies of the National Iranian Resistance Movement led by former premier Shahpour Bakhtiar.

Quoting reliable sources within the Khomeyni administration and stressing that the data has been checked and examined for accuracy several times, GHIAME IRAN states that the funds are kept in separate accounts in Iran as well as in foreign banks, mainly in Switzerland.

"The operation involves cash grants to subversive organisations, provision of weapons and training facilities and even broadcasting stations inside Iran," it says.

The \$2 billion allocation is included in the current annual budget of the Islamic republic under the heading of Centre for Islamic Revolution Documentation. The total amount in the Iranian currency is 170 billion rials, which at the official exchange rate amounts to over 1,000 million pounds sterling.

This is the second highest item in the budget, the highest being a total of 325 billion rials allocated to defence expenditure.

"Inclusion of 170 billion rials under the heading of Centre for Islamic Revolution Documentation naturally caught our eye, especially when allocation to the literacy campaign was a mere 3 billion rials and for universities and other educational institutions was 66 billion rials," the paper says. "We were amazed to see that in a country riddled with unemployment, poverty and misery, where all welfare programmes have been eliminated because of a lack of funds, where food shortages have made life miserable, that the second highest budgetary allocation is covered by such an ambiguous heading," it says.

A former director of the plan organisation who has contacts in the Khomeyni administration informed the paper that the Centre for Islamic Revolution Documentation was a front office for agitation and terrorist activities aimed at destabilisation of other countries. The editors of GHIAME IRAN said they

decided to double check the information through the facilities provided by nationalist groups, mainly Bakhtiar's organisation. An intensive check inside Iran confirmed that the bulk of the money was for subversive work outside Iran, the paper said.

Khomeyni and the mullahs of his camp have never hidden their intention to carry out such acts outside Iran. They have often talked of the need to export the revolution. They were themselves helped and financed by international terrorist groups and the Syrian and Libyan governments. Individuals like former president Bani-Sadr, former foreign ministers Yazdi and Qotbzadeh, and the assassinated son of Ayatollah Montazeri were linked to international terror and subversive groups.

According to IPS sources, meanwhile, the mullahs who operate Khomeyni's foreign subversion programmes often put such funds in their personal accounts in banks outside Iran. The assassinated son of Montazeri, popularly referred to as Ringo the Shaikh, had accounts in Bahrain, Beirut and Europe.

Information given by GHIAME IRAN squares with other documented reports, published in that paper and other exile publications, regarding directives given to Iranian diplomatic staff on helping or organising terror gangs. An Iranian diplomat who last month resigned his post has said that the embassies and consular offices of the Islamic republic treat Iranian nationals like enemies but extend a great deal of help and hospitality to non-Iranian outlaws and renegades, most of whom are not even Muslims.

CSO: 4600/478

'VOICE OF IRAN' ON UPCOMING GCC MINISTERS MEETING

GF141824 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 14 May 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Summary from poor reception] Dear listeners, as we announced in yesterday's newscast, the foreign ministers of the GCC member countries will meet on Saturday in Kuwait and will discuss and exchange views on the Iran-Iraq war.

The efforts of the leaders of the Gulf region for an emergency conference focus on the weakening of Iraqi resistance against the increasing attacks by the Iranian forces. The conference of the ministers of the GCC will take place exactly 3 days after the visit of Bahrain's ruler Shaykh 'Isa Ibn Salman al Khalifah to Kuwait. Informed sources in Manama, the capital of Bahrain express the opinion that the Bahraini ruler is apprehensive about the trend of events on the Iran-Iraq fronts and is trying to obtain sufficient evidence against Iran's (?designs). For this reason he agreed to visit Kuwait.

The first target of the mullahs' regime was apparently the Bahrain Government, but the authorities succeeded in foiling the plot of the terrorists and arsonists of Khomeyni to topple the government of Bahrain exactly 5 months ago.

In any case, the decisions of the GCC members to hold an emergency session in Kuwait expresses the anxiety instilled by Khomeyni and his cohorts' overreaching ambitions in this area. Iran's advance on the front and its recent victories has also contributed to the dismay of the Gulf nations. The anxiety of the heads of the Gulf states is due in large measure to the fact that by capitalizing on the unrest triggered by the Iran-Iraq war, other forces may gain footholds in the region. They believed that the Iran-Iraq war may have curbed the expansionist policy and ambitions of Khomeyni and his coterie, but their recent victories have disturbed the equilibrium in the Gulf region. The ruling mullahs are channelizing the gains of the patriotic armed forces in their own favor by means of their propaganda machinery.

The Saudi Arabia Government, which has assumed the role of the champion of nations of the area against the aggression of Khomeyni's regime, is trying to increase cooperation among Gulf nations.

CSO: 4640/297

IRAN

CLANDESTINE RADIO ON REPLACING ARMY WITH GUARD CORPS

GF150940 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 13 May 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpt] Compatriots, in our program yesterday we said that the mullahs do not want and will not allow the destructive Iran-Iraq war to end or the Iranian Army to become free from it. The continuation of [word indistinct] and the continuation of bloodshed have been reviewed several times during the programs of Radio Iran. We have said several times that the continuation of war is a pretext for the rulers to justify the present shortages and disorder and, on the other hand, the conflict is to prevent the army from playing a role in internal politics and toppling the regime of Ruhollah Khomeyni.

Khomeyni will not be able to stretch out the Iran-Iraq war for months or years because the Iranian people have had enough of it. The tragic death of 12-year old children who are used as human barriers against artillery and as mine detectors, [words indistinct] and are dying has transformed the country into a powder keg. (?People) who never wanted to go to war against anyone are not willing to spend their lives lining up to purchase bread, meat and oil on the pretext of this destructive war.

Khomeyni will not be able to continue the war with Iraq (?forever), but when will this drama of tears and blood end? (Words indistinct) first of all they are (?aiming) at the military officers and NCOs, because the mullahs are waiting for the opportunity and Khomeyni needs time to use his (?right) arm--the [word indistinct] Guard Corps--and strengthen their force against the Iranian armed forces. Khomeyni needs such a force to obey the [word indistinct] unlike the armed forces which [words indistinct] and that their wish is the independence, honor and territorial integrity of the country. The last stages of the mullahs' plan will be implemented, with the approval of the new plan in the mullahs' Islamic Majlis, to give the Guard Corps total independence in the framework of a new ministry. [Words indistinct] of Guard Corps (?constitution) will be discussed during our program tomorrow. But our compatriots in the armed forces should know what plans the turban-wearing satans (?have for them). [Words indistinct] the Islamization of the army has been a total failure so far. [Passage indistinct] Mullah 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Radsanjani, the speaker of the

Islamic Majlis, during the approval of the Guard Corp's (?bill) clearly said that the Guard Corps is dear to the Islamic Majlis and the Islamic Majlis is very dear to the Guard Corps. In other words, the courageous members of the armed forces, who are turning the color of the Khuzestan Desert red with their blood, are not dear to Khomeyni's mercenaries. Their (?only) unforgivable sin is their sacrifice for Iran, and being Iranian is (?against) the principles of Velayat-e Faqih. The Guard Corps are the dearest to the Islamic Majlis and vice versa.

Khomeyni and his clique are warning Hashemi-Rafsanjani that the Iranian armed forces will never follow the line of Velayat-e Faqih, and the existence of such an organization during peacetime will endanger the existence of the Islamic Republic. Therefore, the same thing will happen to the armed forces that happened to our judicial system. Supporting and reinforcing the Guard Corps and signing the peace treaty with Iraq, [words indistinct] will (?allow) the armed ruffians of Khomeyni to (?purge) the armed forces. We must beware or the day will come that with [word indistinct] at the Islamic Majlis, they will dissolve the Iranian Army for their own benefit and put the fate of our country in the hands of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps--an organization consisting of killers, ruffians and criminals. We will review the (?constitution) of the Guard Corps in tomorrow's program.

CSO: 4640/297

CLANDESTINE RADIO REVIEWS MULLAHS' GUERRILLA ACTIONS

GF141747 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT  
12 May 82

[Excerpts] [Passage indistinct] In the years following, when the Savak began to arrest the mullahs, even the supporters of the regime did not give up the struggle. Savak alleged that mullahs were involved in arson and placing of explosives, but no one was willing to believe this. The people of Iran were of the opinion that mullahs are idle and (?lethargic) free-loaders and that placing bombs and arson was beyond (?their scope or capacity).

In districts such as Qom, [words indistinct] but as regards private crimes, the judicial authorities (?had no jurisdiction). Crimes such as murder and burglary, and especially sexual assaults, took place that inflamed public opinion and people (?made efforts) to find the elements responsible for the incidents. The investigation was carried out with intensity and seriousness and the clergyman responsible for the burglary, fraud and (?sexual crimes) begged (?the judge for forgiveness). But the legal and judicial authorities were forced to (?imprison him). [Passage indistinct]

When later in Esfahan, the incident of the murder of Ayatollah Shamsabadi took place, the people's susceptibilities were roused, not only in Esfahan Province but throughout the country. The life of a respected clergyman had been extinguished and his body had been thrown into the marshes.

The people were greatly saddened by this and tried to exert pressure to institute for legal (?action) as soon as possible against those who committed this heinous crime. Naturally, the clergymen fanned this unrest in the mosques and on the pulpits, until a factfinding mission was dispatched to inquire into the incident and was able to remove the veil from the (?atrocity).

It transpired that, due to the distortion of the differences, the (?bickering) of the clergymen and the [word indistinct] of the deceased, the latter had been killed by the agents of Shaykh Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri. The accused were arrested and confessed to their guilt, but under the pressure of the sources of emulation, the government was forced to quiet the rising indignation. [Passage indistinct] This lent strength to the rumor that the government was responsible for the (?killing) of Ayatollah Shamsabadi, and was trying to pin the blame on the heads of innocent (?persons).

The Rex Cinema catastrophe in Abadan in 1977 shook Iran. Due to a major conflagration, about 400 persons were roasted alive in the auditorium of the Rex Cinema in Abadan. All over Iran people shed tears. The perpetrators of this tragic crime mustered all resources at their disposal to rouse public sentiment at home and abroad and turned the fingers of censure in the direction of the regime. The government hastily dispatched inquiry commissions and largescale investigations took place. [Passage indistinct] (?After some time) the person who had caused the fire was arrested on his way to Najaf when he was leaving to submit his report to Khomeyni and his (?cohorts). He admitted to everything.

Despite all these (?incidents), the government put away his dossier as (?classified) and refrained from revealing the facts in case the clergy might be antagonized and the people may not believe it. [Passage indistinct]

During the course of these 3 years, the clique of the ruling clergy has exhibited its prowess in the variety of crimes committed. It has displayed its disregard for the lives and property of others. [Passage indistinct] It has shown that "lawful" or "unlawful" has no significance; it has displayed its ability to trample carelessly, upon the recognized tenets of the Shari'a [Islamic law] according to its own ends, and especially for its own purposes. If these recent events had not taken place, most of the people would never have been able to believe the (?true nature) of the clergyman, as is necessary, or to believe that a clergyman who [words indistinct] in his turban is similarly capable of doing other things under the guise of the same turban when it suits him. [Passage indistinct]

Now the herd of clergymen who have embarked on a contest to drag the name of Ayatollah Shariatmadari into the quagmire have, in the course of 2 weeks, brought him down from the status of his eminence the ayatollah, the source of emulation for the Shi'ites of the world, to the "slave of the imperial court," the "Savak hireling," the "illiterate, villager clergyman," the "spy of Israel and the United States," [word indistinct]. Even now this campaign continues.

Do they not know that the tide turns and will turn? [Passage indistinct]

CSO: 4640/297

## INTERNATIONAL BODIES ASKED TO CONDEMN IRAQI AIR ATTACK

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 8 May 82 p 2

[Text]

**TEHRAN (IRNA)** — Iran calls on international organizations to condemn Baghdad's "premeditated downing of an Algerian executive jet near the Iran-Turkey border Monday which killed the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ben Yahya, and thirteen others on board.

The international organizations slated to receive copies of an official memorandum of the Iranian government included the Human Rights Committee of the International Red Cross, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Court of Justice at the Hague, and the International Air Transport Association (IATA.)

At the Foreign Ministry, meanwhile, officials sharply condemned the Baghdad regime for the attack against the Algerian plane and described the action as a crime and a blatant violation of the international convention which had been approved in Montreal in 1971, and of which Iraq is a signatory.

The undersecretaries of the Foreign Ministry, Kazem-pour Ardebili and Mirmehdi said the people who commit such criminal acts are known as "international criminals" who should be tried and punished.

The Undersecretary of For-

eign Affairs Ministry for Legal Affairs, Mirmehdi said according to the international convention even the intention by any government of attacking passenger planes would be punishable according to section II of paragraph A under article one of the convention. He said on the strength of all available documents the attack against the aircraft had been a premeditated plot by the ruling regime in Iraq which aggravated the original offence.

He noted that the crime had vast dimensions in that it had been committed against a person whose mission was to mediate between Iran and Iraq with the goal of bringing the imposed war to its end. He described the martyred minister as having a brilliant record of struggle against foreign domination.

The Theological school of Qom vehemently condemned the Iraqi attack on a civilian aircraft. The revolutionary as well as government organizations denounced the inhuman act of the Iraqis.

The denunciations came in the wake of the glorious ceremonies that were held in honor of martyrs Ben Yahya and 13 other members who were also on the aircraft.

## AREA COUNTRIES URGED TO JOIN IRAN

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 11 May 82 p 1

[Text]

**TEHRAN (IRNA) —** The Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic issued a statement yesterday following suspicious actions by Zionist and imperialist circles against the Islamic Republic on the verge of the decisive victories of the Islamic forces over the aggressor Iraqi forces.

The statement said that Sultan Qabus and Hosni Mubarak, the King of Oman and the Egyptian President who are both known American and Zionist agents, had recently taken up the banner against the Islamic Revolution and solidarity with the Zionist occupiers of Quds announcing that they would take harsh measures under the cover of supporting the collapsing regime of Saddam Hussein.

While stressing that the Islamic Republic of Iran would never retreat from its revolutionary and Islamic stands until the liberation of Quds and all of occupied Palestine from the Zionists, the statement said that the Arab peoples should pay attention to these points.

"1. Saddam Hussein is a Zionist agent and a dangerous pawn of the U.S. in the region. To secure the position of the occupiers of Quds he has not

only committed treachery against the Iraqi army and people with his aggression on the Islamic Republic of Iran, but has also committed treachery against all of the Arab nation, and he has actually executed the second part of the disgraceful Camp David treaty with this bloody aggression.

"2. The solidarity of Muammar Gaddafi, Qabus and King Hussein along with other U.S. mercenaries in the region against the Islamic Republic of Iran shows the extent of the dread of the Zionists of the Islamic Revolution. It is appropriate for the Arab peoples to ask themselves why and for what reason did the regime in Egypt extend its hands to Begin, this famous terrorist, on one hand, and on the other hand sends soldiers, equipment and munitions to the fronts of the imposed war for the destruction of the cities and the innocent people of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

"3. We once again reiterate that we support peaceful coexistence and the securing of peace and stability in the interest of the oppressed and the Muslims in the region and we will continue this imposed war for the establishment and securing of peace and stability

in the interests of the oppressed until final victory.

"4. We once again stress that by the kind of relations which the regimes in the region choose to have with the Islamic Republic in fact they are choosing their own future. In this respect we again stress that the expansion of friendly relations with countries who have accepted the reality of the Islamic Revolution is not only possible but necessary and vital.

"5. We support the independence of the small countries of the Persian Gulf against any direct and indirect domination by the U.S. and these countries could count on the able forces of the Islamic Revolution in their struggle against the domination of the Superpowers.

"6. We stress that we have always been, and will be along-side the Iraqi people in the campaign against Saddam and along-side the Arab peoples in the campaign against Zionism. And we will act upon our lawful international and Islamic duties in the path for the freedom of the Iraqi people and the liberation of Quds from the clutches of Zionists.

## MORE STATES OPPOSE BAGHDAD FOR NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 11 May 82 p 1

[Text]

**TEHRAN (IRNA)** — Undeniable documents exist proving the Iraqi regime was involved in the crash of the Algerian foreign minister's plane said Foreign Minister Velayati in an interview with the daily Jomhuri Islami on Sunday.

Speaking on his trip to Algeria to attend funeral ceremonies for the Algerian officials he said in his meeting with President Chadli Ben Jедid he emphasized on strengthening Iran-Algeria ties.

The foreign minister also said that on returning to Tehran the Iranian delegation stopped in Syria where they met with Syrian President Hafez Assad and Foreign Minister Abdulhalim Khaddam.

Velayati said that during these meetings they discussed the plane crash in detail with Syrian officials. He added, that they thanked Syrian officials for their positive position in the interest of Iran. He then said that the Algerian mission to investigate the plane crash on May 3rd along with Iranian experts were following up the case in the area and so far have reach-

ed positive results similar to what Iran initially believed. That the crash occurred because of an attack by Iraqi planes on the Algerian plane carrying Algerian Foreign Minister Ben Yahya.

Velayati said that Syria believed that Iraq was responsible for the plane crash and officially announced it the day after the incident.

Concerning the upcoming Non-Aligned Conference, in Algeria instead of Baghdad, Dr. Velayati said that initially Iran was the only country that opposed the Baghdad venue but despite opposition from some pro-Iraq countries gradually all members have realized Iran's rightful opposition.

The foreign minister referring to the bomb explosion in front of the Syrian Embassy on Sunday said that the explosion indicated that the U.S. and its agents were afraid of close ties between progressive Muslim countries and after Iran's victories in the warfronts Iran expected such vain attempts.

CSO: 4600/468

IRAN, GREECE SIGN TRADE AGREEMENT

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 11 May 82 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN, (IRNA) - Muhammad Suri, the Director-General of the Shipping Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Monday morning in a televised press conference said that Greece would purchase \$350 million worth Iranian products on the basis of barter trade and that the Shipping Organization was finally making a profit after 14 years.

Suri said that an Iranian political, commerce and economic delegation including officials of the ministries of Commerce, Oil, Foreign Affairs and of the Fisheries officials of the Iranian Central Bank, recently visited Greece on the official invitation of the Greek government in order to expand economic and political relations between the two countries.

He said that in the negotiations with Greek officials, they discussed building, repairing and renting ships, the purchase of chemical materials, cereals, stone cutting machines, fishing equipment and aluminum products and raw materials.

In some aspects agreements were signed between the two countries but in other fields negotiations would continue later on.

It was decided that an Iranian delegation travel to Greece during harvesting season in July to buy 200 to 500 thousand tons of wheat, Suri said.

He added Iran would sell its oil, chromite and other products to Greece. An agreement was also signed with Greek bank officials for minting of coins and banknote printing, said Suri.

He said Iran would purchase \$247 million of products from Greece annually and Iran might export 30 thousand barrels of oil to Greece daily. Iran would buy some ships from Greece and it was also agreed that Iran would send its ships to Greece to be repaired at cost of \$70 million, added Suri.

## TIES WITH INDIA STRENGTHENED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 3 May 82 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN, (IRNA) - Foreign Minister Vilayati, and members of the Iranian mission arrived here yesterday morning at 11 a.m. local time concluding a 4-day state visit to India, on the invitation of his Indian counterpart.

At the airport Vilayati said that his trip held special importance for the two countries and for the Non-Aligned Movement.

Referring to the historical cultural, religious relations between Iran and India, he said at the moment, Iran stood as a powerful and revolutionary country in one of world's most sensitive regions, attracting world attention to its development.

He said in light of the above point, the strengthening of bilateral relations was indispensable in keeping the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf devoid of the penetration of the Superpowers.

The foreign minister added that he met with the Indian president, prime minister, vice-president, foreign minister and some other ministers and that he had signed a letter of understanding with the Indian foreign minister which was very constructive for the two countries and was a basis for the

future development of relations between the two countries.

He said he spoke with Indian officials on Iran's technological needs and Iran's contribution to India in oil experiences. He added India was going to study oil purchase from Iran.

The foreign minister then said in the letter of understanding, India was asked to assist Iran in the development of steel and metals plants and joint research projects.

Iran and India will also exchange professors' programs in universities.

In the letter of understanding signed between the two countries, they condemned the South African regime's aggression and echoed their support for the liberation-seeking struggles of the Namibian nation, led by SWAPO (South West African Peoples' Organization).

They further expressed their readiness to develop bilateral relations in the commercial, industrial, oil, mines, agricultural, cultural, and technical fields.

They also agreed to sign a cultural accord in the near future.

Other reports said: The significant role of the Non-

Aligned Movement in strengthening international peace and security was emphasized in a joint press statement yesterday after Foreign Minister Vilayati ended his four day official visit to India.

The press statement issued at 1.00 pm (Tehran time) in New Delhi and here also stressed the need to reassert the Non-Aligned Movement's role as an independent non-bloc factor and positive force in preserving peace in the world.

Speaking on peace the ministers reiterated the urgent necessity to remove Superpowers' presence in the Indian Ocean which constituted a threat to peace and "increased tension in the region".

On regional affairs the Zionist attack on the Al Aqsa Mosque as well as the illegal annexation of the Golan Heights was condemned in the statement.

On Afghanistan a just and comprehensive settlement was called for based on Soviet withdrawal non-intervention and full respect for the territorial integrity of Afghanistan.

The joint statement also mentioned that Iran briefed the Indian side on the Iraqi imposed war, and the Indian ministers hoped for a just solution soon.

IRAN

CLANDESTINE RADIO REPORTS INDIAN UNION CONDEMNS REGIME

GF190700 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT  
18 May 82

[Text] Our correspondent in India reports that the Indian trade unions continue to condemn the suffocating Tehran regime.

The statement issued by the Indian Trade Union (SABHA) says that torture, execution and arrests continue mercilessly in Iran. The statement said the struggle for democracy and freedom is a just struggle and needs the support of all freedom-loving people of the world. Dr (Zanasavan), director of this trade union, during the above-mentioned statement, asked that Khomeyni's bandits be condemned by all world organizations and nations. Calling Khomeyni's bandits fascists, he asked that aid be given to the oppressed nation of Iran.

On the other hand, our correspondent, citing the India Muslim Students' Federation, reports that it has been confirmed that Mrs Zohra Abulfazli, a supporter of the Iranian Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, was pregnant when she was executed and moments after her death, [words indistinct] of the cemetery was washing her body and discovered that the child was still alive and the [word indistinct] noticed the child's movements. According to the same report, the [word indistinct] tried to save the child, but the regime's executioners took the [word indistinct] to the mental hospital and announced that the [words indistinct] is crazy and talks nonsense.

CSO: 4640/297

PLO ENVOY DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES AT INTERVIEW

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 15-17 May 82

[Interview with Salah Zawawi, Palestine Ambassador to Islamic Republic, on 13 May in Tehran]

[15 May 82 pp 1, 3]

[Text] LAST THURSDAY (May 13th), we held a friendly talk with Salah Zawawi, the Palestine Ambassador to the Islamic Republic, in his office in Tehran.

At the first encounter, the simplicity of the Ambassador's office and his desk certainly would attract the attention of any new comer. There was not even the slightest shade of luxury or flamboyant decorations which usually greets the eye in other embassies.

We were proud and happy to be in this place which formerly (during shah's regime) housed the representation of the Quds occupying regime (Israel).

At that time this place was an execution center of Zionist plots against our nation and other Muslims while, now, after the Islamic revolution, it has been turned to a nest for the representatives of the deprived Palestinian people who are struggling against the very same Zionist regime.

We, the Iranian Muslims, are proud to announce our full and unsparing support to the Palestinian cause and are whole-heartedly prepared to fight side by side with these struggling Muslim nation against the occupiers until the ultimate liberation of the first Qiblah of Muslims, which we will celebrate by holding a mass prayer in that holy land under the leadership of Imam Khomeini.

It was also interesting to us that the only Persian sentence the Palestinian Ambassador has learned so far was the popular slogan of Iranian Muslims, (O, God, save Khomeini until the revolution of Mahdi, (the 12th Imam).

However, with wishes for the spread of the Islamic armed rebellion of our Palestinian brothers and for the conquest of Quds, let us share the Palestinian envoy's views on the issues we brought up in this friendly talk:

In regard to the recent efforts of reactionary Arab heads of States, such as King Hassan, King Hussein, Sultan Qabus and King Khaled to return Egypt to the Arab world, despite its relations with Israel, the Palestinian Ambassador said that the Egypt for whose return efforts have been launched was an Egypt of Sadat and treason, an Egypt of Camp David and so-called Palestinian autonomy which meant nothing but treading upon all the rights of Palestinians.

"Egypt was formerly" stated Zawawi "the first base of Arab liberation movements and a sympathizer to the cause of all Muslims and Arabs. It was the greatest supporter of Islamic and African countries while it has now turned into an American base.

"We support the return of an Egypt (to the Arab world) which in addition to being liberated from Camp David

Accords, should also take the lead in the struggles of Arabs and Muslims for the attainment of their rights.

"We do not support an Egypt which calls on the Arabs to reckon it as a European country. An Egypt which, claiming to be well aware of the issues in the Arab world, asks the two Super-powers to let it play the stooge act as the mediator between the Arabs and Israel.

"We can never accept the presence of such an Egypt (in the ranks of Arabs) whose Defense Minister Abu Qazalah announces the US commitment to spend \$150,000 annually for each soldier she spares in the Rapid Deployment Force while it can benefit from the Egyptian forces by spending only \$1,200 per man. We can never agree with the return of an Egypt (to the Arab ranks) which has auctioned the Egyptian and

Palestinian nations to the US and acts as an agent in service of aggressive objectives of America in the region and throughout the world..

Saying that the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force is not active enough, Abu-Qazalah also suggests the formation of a (Persian) Gulf Security Force in which Egypt is supposed to enact a fundamental role. He even has the audacity to ask as to why the (Persian) Gulf countries do not pay a dollar on each oil barrel sold for the formation of such a force.

"The aggressive attacks on our people in South Lebanon, the bombardments of the camps and villages of Lebanese people, the raid on Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Shrine of Abraham, the massacre of Muslims and the continued suppression of people's uprising in the West Bank never appeals to Mubarak and the

Egypt of treason (under him) is totally callous toward all these tragedies. It does not even utter a single 'no' to the Zionist Enemy. The question then is to which Arab rank do they intend to return Egypt? There is no such rank (to which Egypt can return) at least unless they aim to extend the Camp David conspiracy and that is what we are totally worried of.

"We thus condemn any move aiming at returning Egypt to the Arab world. On the other hand Abu Qazalah impudently states that the Libyan weaponry might be used in attacking Cairo and even the islands of Maltese and Crete.

He forgets and or convincingly pretends to have forgotten that the Libyan arsenal has been compiled to be employed in fighting against the Zionist enemy and not Egypt.

[16 May 82 p 1]

[Text]

In answer to the second question of the TEHRAN TIMES the PLO Envoy ruled out the possibility of the establishment of autonomous Palestine rule under the framework of the Camp David accords signed by Egypt with Israel on the initiative of the United States.

Zawawi said, "We believe that there is no possibility of co-existence between the wolf with sheep - the aggressor and the one subject to aggression."

He said that there is no possibility of compromise whatever as long as Arabs fighting is

on over the vital issue of the inalienable rights of Islam and on the one side and Zionist and imperialist usurpations on the other.

"There is no question of dividing the land or establishing autonomy," he remarked.

Tracing back to history, he said that at the end of the 19th century the Zionist enemy started migrations to that part of the world only on a small scale but expanding gradually it has occupied the whole of Palestine and part of Arab lands and now plots to create a state ex-

tending from the Nile to the Euphrates.

"It even intends most impudently to destroy the Al-Aqsa Mosque and build a "Solomon's temple" in its place," he said.

"The Zionist enemy has practically seized 42 per cent of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip establishing 130 settlements in these areas. After the annexation of Quds and Golan, after so-called Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, replaced by American and multi-national forces - Begin has declared his intention to establish

another 60 settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank," Zawawi explained in detail.

Continuing on the subject he said the Zionist enemy have so far destroyed great parts of Nebatiah, Sour, Rashlah and other Palestinian camps, along with 90 per cent of the camp in Sore. Israel now in collusion with Lebanese separatists intends total annexation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank areas.

After the destruction of nearly 46,000 houses in South Lebanon, the enemy is still continuing its daily bombardments of residential areas, camps, farms and cities he added. "What kind of autonomy can you expect to achieve faced by such a savage enemy?" he asked. — Zawawi then said that the Zionist retreat from the Sinai was carried out at the price of annexation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank a deal at which they have been plotting.

He said moreover that the "treacherous Mubarik who is to travel to Quds and thus have

the city registered as the capital of Israel in the same way the defunct shah did," was an instrument of the Zionist plot. The PLO enemy said that newly established rural societies packed with Jewish settlers were constantly attacking "our Muslim people in the occupied territories." In our view, any call for a compromise with such an enemy is either betrayal or sheer ignorance of historical facts. The Zionists want to make us aliens in our own land in the same way it has been done to the American Indians. No Arab or non-Arab can or has any right to downplay Arab and Islamic anger to such an enemy and its master, the U.S." he said.

"All the Arab and Islamic media must be employed in mobilizing our masses to fight and resist this enemy. No one can ever stop our future generations from such a Holy Jihad for liberating our people even if all of our present generation be destroyed in this struggle," in the most emotional terms.

On the Fahd plan he said: "All such plans including the

first and second Sinai agreements and the so-called African and United Nation's peace-missions were all a waste of time, but the Palestinian revolution accepted them only to renew its strength and prepare ourselves for continuing the war in all its political, military and economic aspects," he said. "But we are assured that no peace with the Zionists can be made in the way the Arab and Muslim countries wish," he added.

In regard to Fahd plan, "I must say that we practically rejected it in the Fez Conference except under conditions to which we hold," he said. "It was those conditions and objections we raised that led to the failure of the plan. In future too we will nullify any such plan which will bring harm to the tiniest sod of Palestinian soil," he affirmed. "The enemy (Israel) is actually willing to be recognised by Arab states and Palestinians in particular. After such recognition it will then be the turn of the U.S. to enter the scene for negotiations with Palestinians.

[17 May 82 p 1]

[Text]

Speaking on the factors involved in the plane crash carrying the Algerian Foreign Minister Ben Yahya on the Turkish-Iranian border, the PLO envoy said that the Palestinian embassy condemns the incident which led to the loss of a sincere supporter of the Palestinian revolution.

"In my view", he said "the first objective of this treacher-

ous act was to sever the relations of the Islamic Republic and the Arab Steadfastness Front. He then expressed the hope that the documents now being studied will lead to identification of the factors involved in this criminal act.

In regard to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter's recent statement on a regional peace without an autonomous

Palestine state, Zawawi said that it was the United States which brought Zionism into existence.

He added that America spent \$630 for each Israeli citizen every day and were it not for the aerial support by America, the Zionists would have faced a humiliating defeat in the 1973 war. "So, the U.S. and Israel are the two sides of

the same coin," the envoy declared.

He said he was not surprised that Carter, Reagan, or other U.S. lackeys oppose the formation of a Palestinian state. "They are even opposed to the very survival of our nation," he added, due to the fact that they were aware of the historical role our people played in awakening the Arab community, Muslims, and seekers of liberty.

Zawawi said the international recognition of the PLO meant the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people by foreign countries. "That is why our organization seeks recognition of all countries despite the U.S. and Zionist efforts not to recognize it," the ambassador continued.

"America is number one enemy of our people and executor of Zionist plots in our country. The colonialist pow-

er do not provide for the rights of any people, the rights must be taken by force," he said adding that "those rights can be taken only by bringing the U.S. to its knees in the same way that it knelt in Vietnam, Algeria and in Muslim Iran."

The Palestinian envoy also said that if American aid to Israel were blocked, the Zionist state would have been destroyed overnight.

Zawawi asserted that the revolutionary Arab and Islamic forces should transform the world into an arena of war against imperialism and that negotiations were useless and served no purpose. "At the same time, we should not ignore the U.S. as a Superpower. This fact must only lead to strengthen our struggles against its interests and conspiracies," he reiterated.

At the conclusion of the interview, the PLO envoy

asked us to quote him as saying that the first Persian sentence he had learned during his stay in Iran was the popular slogan of "O'God, Save Khomeini until the Revolution of Mahdi" (the 12th Imam). He said pertinently that he liked this sentence not only because of the Palestinians' love for Imam Khomeini but also due to Imam's long-term struggles for the Palestine issue.

"The Imam is the one who called on the world to celebrate a day as the 'Day of Quds' and the one who improvised the slogan of 'Today Iran, Tomorrow Palestine' which is now to be read as 'Yesterday Iran, Today Palestine.'

"May Allah," prayed Zawawi to God, "preserve the Islamic Revolution of Iran and its leader so that we all gather in Quds one day.

"I believe such a day is not far off," he said.

CSO: 4600/479

ATTACK ON LUFTHANSA AIRCRAFT CONFIRMED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 8 May 82 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN, (IRNA)—Following reports of some news agencies which said the pilot and the passengers of the Lufthansa Airways had stated that they knew nothing of the Iraqi fighters' attack to their plane, Iran contacted the spokesman of the Foreign Minister for elucidation.

The spokesman stated that in an air attack fighter planes did not need to be close enough to be seen by the pilot. He added the Iraqi jet fighters on flying from their air force base in northeastern Iraq were tracked by the Tabriz radar center in northwestern Iran. Considering the news maps of the radar authorities and the record about the Algerian airplane, the Iraqi fighters recognized immediately and the ground control ordered the Lufthansa pilot to change course to Ankara, Turkey. Therefore he concluded the said airplane was saved from certain danger.

The Lufthansa passengers

whose plane was chased Monday night by Iraqi jet fighters, reached Tehran the next day by an Iran Air 737 aircraft.

The Iranian pilot at the airport told IRNA that he contacted the pilot of the Lufthansa plane. The Lufthansa pilot told him that when they were reaching the Iranian border the Tabriz control tower announced the red condition, so the plane returned to Ankara, Turkey.

One of the Iranian passengers of the Lufthansa plane said to IRNA that while they were in flight the pilot told them there had been a problem and they had been warned to change course or return to Ankara.

The IRNA reporters in Ankara and Frankfurt tried to meet the Lufthansa pilot and went to his residence but were prevented from meeting the pilot by the authorities of the airline.

CSO: 4600/465

## BRIEFS

GUARDS KILLED IN TEHRAN--A spokesman of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization contacted the Free Voice of Iran reporter and said that during the past few days of armed clashes between members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq and the hirelings of the Khomeyni regime in various parts of Tehran, some of the guards and police officials of Khomeyni's regime had been killed. Last Tuesday, a group of guards patrolling Hashemi Avenue were the targets of attack operation of the members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization. Three of the guards were killed. Last Thursday at 0800 hours, an operations unit of the Mojahedin-e Khalq was attacked by a group of Revolution Guards on Ferishteh Avenue, but the Mojahedin were able to kill one of the guards by blowing up their vehicle. In this skirmish, one of the Mojahedin members was injured in [word indistinct]. On the same day, an operations unit of the Mojahedin-e Khalq attacked a unit of the guards patrolling Bahar Avenue and killed the members of the guards. On Wednesday, in another attack, a group of four police officials, who are known as the anti-terrorist task force, were killed. [Text] [GF141759 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 14 May 82]

TREATMENT OF AFGHAN REFUGEES--According to well-informed sources in Pakistan, 150 Afghan refugees who returned to their homeland have called Iran's situation very sorrowful. The refugees, who because of their opposition to Babrak Karmal's [word indistinct] regime had taken refuge in Iran, said that Ayatollah Khomeyni's regime is not Islamic or revolutionary. They stressed that the so-called Islamic regime of Ayatollah Khomeyni is hated by the Iranian people. The Tehran regime's stance in regard to the people of Afghanistan is very regrettable. Among the 150 Afghan refugees are a number of [word indistinct], university lecturers and officers of previous Afghan Army. They said that they preferred to return to their country rather than witnessing the crude, barbaric and inhuman treatment of the Iranian Muslim people and Afghan Muslim refugees by agents of the Islamic regime. It was previously reported that the so-called Islamic republic's regime accepts only those Afghan refugees who cooperate with the guards against nationalist forces in Kordestan and Azarbajjan. [Text] [GF180624 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 17 May 82]

FATE OF IRANIAN ESCAPEE--An Iranian student, Manuchehr Rashidi, lost his life while escaping Khomeyni's Islamic hell. The young student had hidden himself in the undercarriage well of a Turkish airlines aircraft and died

from being crushed by the wheels when the gear closed after take off. His body--and we must consider the mullahs his murderer--was found in Istanbul Airport. [Text] [GF171455 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 17 May 82]

NEW MAYOR OF MAHSHAHR--Mr Faramand Hashemizadeh has been appointed mayor of Mahshahr Port by the Khuzestan General Governorate. [GF140808 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1330 GMT 13 May 82]

CSO: 4640/297

IRAQ

BAGHDAD CALLS ON IRANIANS TO REBEL, END WAR

NC081058 Baghdad in Persian to Iran 0600 GMT 8 May 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] What has the regime's 20-month war and the clergymen's war-mongering policy brought for the Iranian people? The world's political circles are carefully watching the savage and (?inhumane) acts of Khomeyni's regime and consider the regime's recent attacks as a last effort. The clergymen are trying to gain a victory these days at any cost.

Contradicting reports have disgraced the clerical regime. On the one hand Khamene'i speaks of the (?futility) and defeat in the recent attacks and, on the other hand, revolution guards leader Reza'i claims that the first stage of the recent offensive has not yielded results yet. Nevertheless, the war continues with intensity and each day a group of men is sacrificed. Iran's youths give their lives on the fronts and are sacrificed because of wrong plans, wrong thoughts and the melancholia of a bunch of unrestrained clergymen who care for nobody and only power can quench their inordinate thirst.

For 20 months now the clergymen have made promises. For 20 months now they condemn peace and prefer war. For 20 months now they are saying that the destiny of the war should be determined in the war arena and the result of this obstinacy is very clear. One cannot find one family in the whole of Iran that is not in mourning. There is not a single family that has not been plunged into sadness. There are many people who have lost a son and whose dear one has been sacrificed for the wicked whims of the clergymen and all of whom are waiting for a suitable opportunity to avenge the mullahs.

How and when will the war end and these massacres stop? The formula for ending the war is in the hands of the Iranian people for whom the death of each Iranian youth is an irreparable calamity. These people should become forerunners, rise and shout and condemn the war. They are the ones who should determine the fate of the clergymen and the destiny of Iran. The only solution and the only way in which the Iranian people can free themselves from all these crimes that are being committed in the name of Islam is the people's rebellion. You should not be afraid. You should rebel. You should unite with the true clergymen and put an end to the mullahs' rule of death and blood. The world is waiting for the revolutionary movement of the noble Iranian people.

CSO: 4400/276

IRAQ

KURDISH PARTY GRANTS AMNESTY TO GOVERNMENT SUPPORTERS

JN161847 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Revolution in Surani Kurdish 1500 GMT  
15 May 82

[Text] The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Command Committee has issued the following statement: To mark the occasion of the uprisings and the popular rebellions which are sweeping Kurdistan, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Command announces that as of 15 May 1982 all armed followers of the regime are pardoned from all the crimes which they committed against the people, the homeland and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan on the condition that they abandon their criminal and treasonous activities and join the ranks of the Peshmerga. The pardon includes the following:

First, all mercenaries except the following traitors: Khalah Faraj, Tahsin Kawis, Rashid Salih, Salih Khayyat, 'Ashir Ruwa, Jamal Ringo, 'Arif Babkir, Hama Khan, and 'Abbas Bayiz Agha. Second, all members of the unpopular army. Third, all members of the security and secret police forces. Fourth, all the armed followers of the ruling party and members of trade unions which belong to the regime.

The regime's armed individuals and groups can contact the units and the branches of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, or they can contact the headquarters. The Peshmerga units and the branches and committees of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan are requested to welcome those who leave the fascist regime and join the ranks of the Peshmerga. They are also warned to watch for the enemy's vile schemes which will exploit this opportunity and send their agents to cause chaos and sabotage.

CSO: 4400/276

IRAQ

IRAN'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT CHILDREN POW'S CRITICIZED

JN111500 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1200 GMT 11 May 82

[Text] Baghdad, 11 May (INA)--The Foreign Ministry today replied to Iran's refusal to receive the Iranian children POW's whom Iraq decided to return to their parents in view of their age and due to humanitarian considerations. In a statement issued in this regard, a Foreign Ministry official spokesman said that the Iranian authorities by refusing to receive the Iranian children POW's and handing them over to their parents flout the most basic of human rights and continue with their criminal attitudes.

The spokesman added that the Iranian behavior sheds more light on the truth behind this fascist clique and the nature of its criminal thinking which contradict the simplest principle of noble Islam. He indicated that the Iraqi authorities have undertaken all necessary arrangements to return these children to their parents through the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] under its supervision and without demanding Iraqi POW's in exchange for these captured children.

The Iraqi official spokesman added that the ugly and inhuman behavior by the Iranian regime which pushes children under the age of 15 into the battlefield contravenes human values and international law. He added that Iran's act of sending children into the furnace of this cruel war points to the Iranian authorities' morbid dreams of continuing the war against Iraq and the whole region. The spokesman asserted that the collapsing Iranian regime attempts to evade its horrible crime by denying that these Iranian children POW's belong to Iran.

The Foreign Ministry official spokesman said that despite Iraq's humane attitude and the efforts by the ICRC to return these Iranian children POW's to their families, the ruling clique in Tehran attempts to evade its commitments toward its citizens in a way that deeply reflects its criminal and fascist attitude. The spokesman added that the ruling clique in Tehran which persecutes the Iranian peoples and denies them their will, ignored all the humanitarian calls to allow the return of the Iranian children POW's to their families. These captive children fell into the hands of the Iraqi forces during previous battles. They are still being captured by the Iraqi forces and several were captured during battles west of Karum River.

The Revolution Command Council had decided to return these children to their families for humanitarian considerations through the ICRC without demanding Iraqi POW's in exchange. The responsible Iraqi authorities notified the ICRC of the Revolution Command Council's decision. The authorities also attempted to pacify these children by organizing a program in which they visited several schools in Baghdad and holy shrines in al-Kazimiyah and provided them with new clothes and presents.

President Saddam Husayn received the Iranian children POW's and urged them to continue with their education. The children promised to write to him and to visit Iraq when the war ends. President Saddam Husayn's daughter Hala, who is 6 years old, distributed white roses to the Iranian children POW's. President Saddam Husayn described these roses as symbols of love and peace.

CSO: 4400/276

## BRIEFS

KURDISH AUTONOMY COUNCIL MEETING--Irbil, Kurdish Autonomy Center, 16 May (INA)--Ahmad 'Abd al-Qadir, president of the Legislative Council of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region, has stressed that the imperialist onslaught against Iraq is aimed at stopping its development projects and cultural progress. Speaking during a meeting of the Legislative Council held within its annual session today, 'Abd al-Qadir said that all must contribute toward strengthening the national unity which is the basis for Iraq's triumph over this imperialist onslaught. He called for promoting and developing the autonomy which the Kurdish people are enjoying in Iraqi Kurdistan so that it will remain bête noir for rancorous enemies. During the meeting, in which the chairman and members of the Executive Council of the autonomy took part, the Legislative Council discussed a report by the General Secretariat of the Financial and Administrative Department on the department's activities during the fiscal year. The council also discussed a report submitted by the Economic and Financial Committee of the Legislative Council. A Legislative Council vote entrusted Muhammad Hasan Dizza'i with the post of secretary general to the Financial and Administrative Department of the autonomous region. [Text] [JN161721 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1535 GMT 16 May 82]

SADDAM HUSAYN, KHAYRALLAH ESCAPE ATTEMPT--Baghdad--A reliable source has disclosed that an attempt was made to assassinate tyrant Saddam Husayn and his clique. Criminal Saddam and his Defense Minister 'Adnan Khayrallah were wounded, while Saddam's aide was killed. Khayrallah was sent abroad for treatment. In the meantime, popular demonstrations are continuing in Kurdistan. [Text] [JN102108 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan in Surani Kurdish 1600 GMT 10 May 82]

IRANIANS' SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS--Baghdad, 8 May (INA)--In a dispatch from the battlefield, the al-Thawrah mission reports the appearance of sophisticated Eastern and Western weapons in the hands of the Iranian forces. The al-Thawrah mission reports that a large number of Iranian troops and Khomeyni guards carry automatic kalashnikovs, RPG launchers and sophisticated U.S. weapons. The mission adds that the appearance of these weapons means that Tehran continues to receive weapons and assistance from abroad and that the Zionist enemy provides Iran with U.S. weapons while the weapons from the Eastern Bloc are supplied by various sources, primarily by the Damascus regime. The al-Thawrah mission describes the battles that took place yesterday as a new epic which will not abate or halt until the Iraqi fighters

fully foil the Iranian attack which the enemy launched at dawn yesterday. The mission reports that the battlefield is littered with the enemy's dead while the enemy's tanks and equipment have been transformed into piles of iron as a result of the attacks by the Iraqi tanks and helicopters and our artillery barrage of fire. [Text] [JN080826 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0740 GMT 8 May 82]

THIRD DIVISION COMMANDER EXECUTED--The dictatorial regime is killing its own agents. Our second branch says the funeral of traitor agent Jawad Al'ad Shitnah, commander of the third division, has been held in Irbil. It is recalled that this criminal had been arrested recently together with a number of officers at the Khorramshahr [al-Muhammarah] front and he was executed by the Baghdad regime. This criminal had always served the fascist regime and had always antagonized the Kurdish people and their liberation movement. Thus, Saddam Husayn's regime is killing its own agents mercenaries. [Text] [JN081848 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan in Surani Kurdish 1600 GMT 8 May 82]

POW'S DISPATCHED TO IRAQI POSITIONS--A new batch of Iranian POW's captured by the Iraqi forces west of Karun were transported to one of our rear positions this morning. The INA team in the southern sector reported that the POW's included a number of wounded, who were given immediate medical treatment. The Iranian POW's expressed their thanks and appreciation for the humanitarian treatment rendered to them by our valiant soldiers. [Text] [JN071832 Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1800 GMT 7 May 82]

NATIONALS TO RETURN HOME--All Iraqis in the Gulf have been told to return to Baghdad in the next 3 months or face losing their passports. Embassies throughout the Gulf have been putting notices in papers informing Iraqis of the decision by the Iraqi Government. No reason was given for the decision. [Text] [GF101119 Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 10 May 82 p 5]

CSO: 4400/276

KUWAIT

PAPER COMMENTS ON POSSIBILITY OF EGYPT'S RETURN TO ARAB FOLD

LD111238 Kuwait KUNA in English 1126 GMT 11 May 82

[Article from the press review]

[Text] Kuwait, 11 May (KUNA)--AL-SIYASAH on the Iranian-Iraqi war and Egypt's return to the Arab fold:

"Once more we say that Egypt is a source of potential manpower for the Arab nation. The importance of this has been proven in the Iraq-Iran war.

"Many countries are playing the role of war traders between the two countries who have been fighting for about 20 months.

"The failure of Iran will have adverse effects on the plans of some countries. Likewise, if Iraq retreats this would mean damage to some Arab equations which may touch some local Arab fronts.

"Iraq restored diplomatic relations with Iran during the 1973 war after long years of ruptured relations. The decision was historic despite the negative interpretation of some who claimed that Iran had commercial relations with Israel and an Israeli commercial representative. On that day Iraq considered the 1973 war in which Egypt and Syria fought against Israel as a Muslim war against aggression.

"Now, what prevents the Arab world from restoring its complete relations with Egypt? Doing so would make Cairo and its president feel that, despite their troubles with Israel, they do not face troubles with the Arab world.

"The Camp David treaty ended with complete withdrawal. It proved that Egypt restored its land rationally and not through bombastic words.

"The Arab world is invited now to realize its position. Egypt has manpower potential whether they like it or not."

CSO: 4400/271

KUWAIT

OFFICIAL URGES MOBILITY FOR ARAB WORKERS

GF200810 Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 18 May 82 p 1

[Text] Kuwait, 17 May--"Some European countries are planning to get rid of Arab workers and the issue "will be discussed in the forthcoming Arab European dialogue, Kuwait's Social Affairs Undersecretary 'Abdullah Ghulam Husayn said today. [Quotation marks as published] "The Arab laborers still live in slums or huts," he said, adding that it was "distressing to see their plight in Europe."

He said efforts had been made by the International Labor Organization and some European countries to transfer this manpower to Arab countries. But the efforts had not been successful so far.

At present there are over three million Tunisian, Algerian and Moroccan workers in Europe who lack both training and equal opportunities, he said.

"They should be trained to a higher degree and their children should be taught Arabic. They must refuse to live as strangers in the European community," he said.

'Abdullah Husayn, who also spoke of efforts to reduce reliance on foreigners, said it would take some 10 years to substitute expatriates with qualified Arab hands in the region.

He said efforts to attract Arab manpower to work in the region were meant while slowly bearing fruit. [Sentence as published]

The policy aimed at easing restrictions on mobility of Arab work force within the Arab world, training skilled personnel and to persuade highly qualified Arabs not to emigrate.

The policy was first born in 1971, he said, but a first comprehensive agreement on mobility of Arab manpower was not signed until 5 years later.

In that agreement it was suggested that investment in Arab cities be multiplied so as to create job opportunities for Arabs. At the same time, the agreement was concerned with ways of finding incentives to dissuade highly qualified personnel from emigrating abroad.

In the Arab Gulf, the charter has been taken up by the Arab Labor Organization [ALO] and Labor Affairs and Social Affairs Council of the GCC, he added. Their overall aim is to limit the number of non-Arab expatriates working in the Gulf.

Husayn explained that the original agreement has been so far ratified by only Jordan, the Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Somalia and Palestine. Other states at the time were not able to unify their employment policies.

Two separate committees have since been formed by the ALO to follow up recommendations and implement permanent agreements. The two committees also liaise with countries which had not yet signed the accords.

"It is recognized," the official said, "that most of the recommendations cannot be implemented until suitably qualified manpower is available."

"To this end, the first center for training skilled labor has been set up in Libya, to open next year. Another center is planned for the eastern Arab states era."

Meanwhile an Arab Labor Agency has been established by ALO in Tangier, Morocco, to liaise between labor-supply and labor-import Arab countries.

CSO: 4400/271

KUWAIT

BRIEFS

COMMENTS ON CALL AGAINST ZAIRE--Manama, 18 May (WAKH)--The English language newspaper KUWAIT TIMES regrets the decision taken by the government of Zaire to restore diplomatic relations with Israel and calls it an unwise decision. KUWAIT TIMES praises the decision of the African states to sever their diplomatic relations with Israel and describes the decision as an expression of solidarity with the Arab world and a condemnation of the Israeli aggression which dispersed thousands of Palestinians from their lands. The paper asks how Zaire could have forgotten the close ties which exist between Israel and the racist South African regime, which oppresses black Africans. KUWAIT TIMES supports Kuwait's call for severing diplomatic and economic relations with Zaire as a normal reaction to Zaire's decision. It demonstrates that the rulers of Zaire cannot receive Arab aid with one hand and stab the Arabs in the back with the other. [Excerpt] [GF181641 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1200 GMT 18 May 82]

DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET OFFICIAL--Kuwait, 13 May (KUNA)--The head of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences and specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, Yevgeniy Primakov, conferred today with Kuwaiti deputy prime minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Information Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah. It has been reported that the discussion at this meeting, which was also attended by Soviet Ambassador Nikolay Sikachev, centered on bilateral relations and international issues of common interest, chiefly the Middle East crisis. [Text] [LD131028 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1409 GMT 12 May 82]

NEW EDITOR FOR 'AL-'ARABI--Dr Muhammad al-Rumayhi has recently been appointed the editor-in-chief of AL-'ARABI magazine, according to an Arabic newspaper. Dr al-Rumayhi replaced Ahmad Baha' al-Din who had resigned as the editor and returned to Egypt. He has assumed an important post with AL-AHRAM. Dr al-Ramayhi will assume his responsibility "shortly." Presently, he is a professor at the sociology department, Kuwait University. He is also a renowned author and has published several books on the recent developments in the Gulf. [Text] [GF121121 Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 11 May 82 p 7]

CSO: 4400/271

## LIBYA

### LIBYA PREPARES FOR OAU SUMMIT

London AL-ZAHAF AL-AKHDAR in English 14 May 82 p 7

[Text]

**ACTIVE PREPARATIONS** are now in hand for the forthcoming summit conference of the Organisation of African Unity, which is to be held in Tripoli under the chairmanship of Muammar Qadhafi later this year.

Libya's hosting of the OAU summit and the Leader's chairmanship of the organisation this year have both underlined the strength of the Libyan Jamahiriya's position in Africa.

This strength has come about as a result of Libya's statesmanlike stance on many issues facing Africa, including Chad, and also because of Libya's unwavering commitment to the liberation from racist rule of the whole of southern Africa.

Last year's Nairobi summit was a triumph for Libyan diplomacy, as even Libya's enemies were forced to admit. Anticipating a divided summit, many western observers were frankly staggered by the reception which Libya received from African states, as it put forward its case on the difficult Chad problem.

It had been wrongly presumed that the pro-American states within the OAU would lead a successful diplomatic assault on Libya, politically isolating her within the African

community. In the event, one African leader after another, including several from states with very different social systems from Libya's, stood up in the hall at Nairobi to praise the way in which Libya had handled the Chad problem.

The consensus of African opinion was, and remains, that Libya had done both Chad and Africa a service by stabilising the situation there after fourteen years of terrible civil war.

#### Promises honoured

Despite all the base allegations which had been spread by the United States and its friends about Libya's intentions in Chad, when the head of Chad's provisional government, Goukouni Oueddei, requested the withdrawal of Libyan forces, his request was immediately complied with. Moreover, Libya's swift, dignified and efficient withdrawal was in marked contrast with the

mayhem and violence which unhappily followed that withdrawal.

Events in Chad since the withdrawal have served to support the Libyan Jamahiriya's contention that Libya's military intervention, which, it should be remembered, took place at the express request of the Chad government, gave Chad one precious year of peace amid a generation of war.

Now that the chairmanship of the OAU is to pass from Kenya, which hosted last year's meeting, to Libya, Libya has the opportunity not only to show the rest of Africa what has been achieved since the 1969 September Revolution, but she also has the opportunity to take the lead on a number of important issues facing the whole continent.

There is no doubt that Libya will place great emphasis upon the continuing struggles of both SWAPO and the ANC in southern Africa, which

deserve the full and unqualified support of all Africans.

Libya will also doubtless seek to reinforce the close bonds which link the Arab Nation with the African continent. But for many African states, the primary concern is the battle for development, a concern which Libya shares and understands.

It was thus only fitting that Libya should demonstrate this concern by hosting a meeting of Africa's least developed countries, which opened in Tripoli on April 26th. In the speech to this second ministerial conference of these states, Libya's Secretary for Planning, Fawzi Shakshuki, told African representatives that the Libyan Jamahiriya will continue to support the African peoples' right to control their own economic resources.

In spite of these enormous economic resources, the Planning Secretary said that Africa remained one of the world's 'poorest continents. This he ascribed to foreign exploitation and neo-colonialism.

Secretary Shakshuki told the assembled delegates that: 'Africa is now also the victim of an unjust world economic order that is retarding the continent's growth and robbing it of its resources in an attempt to keep it in a state of constant reliance on others.'

### Immediate measures

Pointing to the dangerous economic and social conditions prevailing in Africa, where millions are suffering from poverty, disease and malnutrition, the Planning Secretary called for immediate measures to be taken to alleviate this situation, adding that the responsibility for Africa's economic development must lie with the continent's governments and peoples and with no one else.

Alluding to the similar problems of hardship and deprivation which Libya had herself suffered before the 1969 Revolution, the Secretary said that Libya's prosperity as in part the result of the Libyan people controlling their own resources, which had enabled them to implement their ambitious development programme.

Secretary Shakshuki said that the Libyan Jamahiriya had contributed its fair share in supporting Africa's least developed states by providing financial aid and technical assistance and by establishing joint companies and economic projects.

At the same ministerial meeting in Tripoli, Dr Adibayou Adiji, the executive secretary of the UN African Economic Committee and the assistant under-secretary of the UN, pointed to the continent's dangerous food shortage — recently worsened by the drought in southern Africa — and called on the UN's organisation for African development to increase its assistance, so that least developed states can implement their development programmes and solve their economic problems.

Dr Adiji reiterated the point made earlier by Secretary Shakshuki, declaring that the only alternative open to Africa today as it tackles its economic problems, is self-reliance upon indigenous resources.

Dr Adiji further called for the establishment of Africa's own manufacturing industries, as well as for the development of African technical expertise and for the expansion of local and regional markets.

This meeting in Tripoli of the least developed countries underlines the importance of developing a comprehensive African economic strategy, which will be able to deal with the

continent's pressing problems on a continental, rather than piecemeal level. It is this general approach which underlines Libya's African diplomacy.

A demonstration of this kind of comprehensive approach was provided the day after the opening of the least developed countries' second ministerial conference, when more than forty African planning ministers descended on Tripoli for the eighth ministerial conference of the African Economic Committee.

### Pioneering role

The holding of the conference in Tripoli was seen by observers as testimony to the Libyan Jamahiriya's pioneering role in promoting African issues and in supporting the just claims of African peoples to control and exploit their wealth and resources in their own interests.

The Libyan delegation at the meetings of the preparatory technical committee of economic experts, presented the meeting with a resolution dealing with the harmful effects of world recession upon Africa.

Pointing to the UN General Assembly's many decisions concerning the creation of a new economic world order and also concerning the UN's strategy for new development in Africa and the issue of sovereignty over resources, the resolution evoked the right of African peoples to freely exploit their resources without external interference.

Denouncing economic pressures practised by external powers and interests against Africa, the resolution urged all African countries to co-operate in the creation of a comprehensive development plan for Africa, in accordance with the Lagos agreements. The resolution

was passed and is one of several that were discussed at the subsequent ministerial meeting.

Among those taking part in the meeting was General Edem Kodjo, the Secretary of the OAU, who held a meeting on April 27th with Libya's Secretary for Foreign Liaison Affairs, Abdulati Obeidi. The two discussed the preparations now in hand for holding the forthcoming OAU summit conference in Tripoli, as well as co-operation between Libya and the OAU.

Discussions centred upon the need to promote the interests of Africa, in particular the cause of the liberation movements, which are currently endangered by imperialism.

The planning ministers' meeting afforded several of those who attended the meeting the opportunity to hold bilateral talks with other African opposite numbers. Among these discussions were those between Musa Abu Freiwa, Libya's Secretary for Economy and Light Industry and Ethiopia's First Minister for Economy and Planning. Held on April 26th before the opening of the meeting, the two discussed bilateral relations and ways of furthering co-operation between Libya and Ethiopia.

Secretary Freiwa also held talks with Dr Abdulrahman Khan, executive director of the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), who was in Tripoli for the African Economic Committee meetings.

Praising Libya's achievements in all fields,

Dr Khan expressed UNIDO's readiness to co-operate with Libya and Africa in the technical field. Dr Khan and Secretary Freiwa also discussed UNIDO's particular co-operation with Libya in carrying out Libya's own development plan.

#### Media coverage

Amongst the many preparations now in hand for the forthcoming OAU summit in Tripoli are those for media coverage of the events. These preparations were discussed in Tripoli between representatives of the Jamahiriya News Agency and the general director of the Pan-African News Agency, Othman Dialo, during his 2-day visit to Tripoli on April 26th and 27th.

Africa's news chief also discussed plans for the new regional headquarters of the Pan-African news agency, which is to be set up in Libya as a result of the agreement signed by the council of African Information Ministers at their recent Addis Ababa meeting.

From all these frenetic comings and goings and discussions, it is clear that the African diplomatic focus has already now shifted to Libya, in preparation for the OAU summit.

There is no doubt that Libyans value the honour accorded to them by their hosting of the OAU summit and many other OAU meetings. The Libyan Jamahiriya is determined to make its chairmanship of the OAU a resounding success, not just for Libya, but also for the whole of Africa.

SYRIA

PAPER ON U.S. REACTIONARY ALLIANCE IN MIDEAST

JN201230 Damascus SANA in Arabic 0845 GMT 20 May 82

[Text] Damascus, 20 May (SANA)--Today's newspapers call on the Arab nation, especially the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front states, and the Arab foreign ministers' conference, which will soon meet, to quickly and seriously contain the suspect moves in the Arab arena, moves which are aimed at establishing an alliance in the region which will be hostile to liberation movements and will form a link between agent Arab regimes and the United States.

TISHRIN says: These moves, which have become obvious following the formal Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, are represented by the invitation to Egypt to rejoin the Arab ranks while it is still burdened by the consequences and provisions of its agreement with the Zionist enemy.

The paper explains that the first of these moves was Sultan Qabus's visits to Cairo and Amman to coordinate between the two agent regimes. This was followed by an exchange of visits between the Egyptian and Iraqi regimes and by the visit of the Jordanian prime minister to Baghdad. These visits were a serious attempt to coordinate between these states and others in order to link them to the capitulatory Camp David agreements one way or another by playing on their fear of Iranian and Soviet dangers as well as the danger of Arab liberation movements.

TISHRIN says: In the face of this intensified reactionary-imperialist move, the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front had to move effectively in the opposite direction in order to put an end to this gross violation of Arab resolutions, especially the resolutions of the Baghdad summit conference which have made it incumbent to sever relations with Egypt as long as it clings to the Camp David accords and peace with Israel.

The paper says: Contrary to this agent move, Syria made a genuine pan-Arab move when President Hafiz al-Asad visited Libya and Algeria and met with the chairman of the PLO Executive Committee as a prelude to formulating a unified Arab strategy capable of meeting the challenges confronting our Arab nation, foremost of which is the Zionist threat.

The paper asserts that the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, headed by Syria, will prove that it is capable of triumphing, because, as President al-Asad has said, victory will only be for the Arabs and the Arab masses.

In another commentary TISHRIN says: If the old Arab reactionaries are now forming an alliance with the new renegade forces in the region, why do they make excuses about the imaginary danger coming from the Arab radical states, the Soviet Union and Iranian revolution? Why do they talk about the danger of infiltration into the region?

TISHRIN asks: Do we not understand from all this that the question is no more than a U.S.-reactionary alliance to protect those who are afraid? Is the United States not afraid also? Yes, it is. This is why it has set the record in plotting.

The paper adds: King Husayn is escaping his Iraqi predicament and is trying to find a new alliance to protect his throne. He has also sent his brother to Washington to hold military talks. Saddam, who once dreamed of the influence enjoyed by the shah of Iran, has run to the Egyptian regime for help. Yet the summit conference which he himself hosted, condemned that regime. Hassan II went to Washington to permit U.S. military bases in his country and to frankly announce his fear of the Polisario Front so that he can play a role in the Arabization of the Camp David accords and in encircling Algeria and Libya. Abu Ghazalah has gone to Sudan to coordinate a plot in the Horn of Africa against the PDRY.

TISHRIN concludes: All these people and what they represent are now afraid of the Arab steadfast front. This fear is justified.

CSO: 4400/276

SYRIA

DAMASCUS COMMENTS ON ARAB MOVES TOWARD EGYPT

JN191456 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1215 GMT 19 May 82

[Station commentary]

[Text] It is wrong to believe that the current endeavors to establish ties, contacts and relations with the regime of Husni Mubarak are Arab endeavors despite the fact that certain Arab quarters and a strong propaganda machine, some of which use Arabic, are taking part in such endeavors. It is wrong to believe that these endeavors are Arab, that the motives behind them are pan-Arab motives and a desire to maintain Arab solidarity or to aspire to a unity of Arab ranks in the face of the threats facing the Arab nation in its main and basic cause of Palestine. This process is not an Arab process; whatever Arab flavor we find in it has been introduced by Washington and Israel to further their own interests. This process is being implemented with haste and impatience.

In a recent speech in Philadelphia, Reagan revealed the true nature of this U.S. scheme and the nature of those who have involved themselves in this scheme. Reagan did not say that the work is going on so that Egypt will return to the Arabs who have committed themselves to rejecting and condemning the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty of surrender. Reagan said: Work is underway so that the Arab states might become like Egypt and take the path of Camp David.

U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig recently reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to working for a strategic consensus in the Middle East. This strategic consensus, which the United States wants, is Arab and Israeli agreement that the threat facing the region is coming from the USSR and that this threat demands that they enlist in the U.S. Army and to forget their differences so that they can fight the USSR, ensure the continued U.S. imperialist control over the Arab oil wealth and transform the region into a U.S. circle of influence.

Despite all the good options open to it, the regime of Husni Mubarak affirmed its commitment to the Camp David agreements and the treaty of surrender to Israel, and reiterated that Israel is not a threat to the Arab nation. This regime, therefore, has committed itself to become a U.S. satellite,

has accepted to exist in the same trench with Israel and has virtually abandoned the pan-Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause which is the first and basic Arab cause.

It was only natural for the Saddam regime to meet with the Mubarak regime despite all the forged extremist slogans. By launching war against Iran, the Saddam regime has declared its acceptance of the U.S. strategy and its rejection of the pan-Arab strategy. It has worked so that the Arabs might be diverted from facing their Zionist enemy so as to fight a natural ally for the Arabs, namely, the Iranian revolution.

Any call for establishing contacts, ties or relations with the regime of Husni Mubarak essentially constitutes a move along the path of the Camp David agreement, a recognition of Israel and a renunciation of the pan-Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause and the resolutions of the Arab summits. This fact will not change if some of those who call for this policy have Arabic names and use the Arabic language. Those who call for this policy which has been rejected and condemned by the Arab masses are, thus, confronting these Arab masses who will have no mercy on those who tamper with the pan-Arab responsibilities and will not forgive those who place themselves in the service of the schemes of imperialism and Zionism.

The Arab masses want the Arab ranks to be united but not behind the United States, Israel and Camp David; they want Arab solidarity but not with the Mubarak regime, which is mortgaged to imperialism and Zionism. They want solidarity against the imperialist and Zionist schemes. Those who think that the apparent calm of the Arab scene is that of a graveyard know nothing about the nature of the Arab masses; they do not know that under the ashes there are embers which will burn all the traitors and renegades and all the anti-Arab schemes.

CSO: 4400/276

## OFFICIAL RECEIVES CYPRIOT PARTY DELEGATION

JN122016 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1915 GMT 12 May 82

[Text] Comrade 'Abdallah al-Ahmar, assistant secretary general of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, received in Damascus this evening the delegation of All Cyprus Front for Reform [Jabhat 'Umum Qubrus li al-Tajdid], led by the Front's Chairman Dr (Sivyanus).

The talks dealt with relations of friendship and cooperation between the two friendly parties and countries. Comrade al-Ahmar outlined the situation in the Arab region under the current imperialist-Zionist, reactionary onslaught which is led by the United States against the world's peoples. In this regard he noted U.S. alliance with the Zionist enemy and the Camp David parties and supporters. He said that this alliance is mainly intended to weaken Syria's steadfastness, to implement the hostile capitulatory scheme, to liquidate the Palestinian cause and to drag the entire region into the lap of imperialism and Zionism.

Al-Ahmar reasserted our people's decisive stance under the leadership of Comrade Hafiz al-Asad and their confrontation of all imperialist, Zionist and reactionary designs in order to foil all these designs and bring about a just peace based on the liberation of the occupied Arab territories and the recognition of the Palestinian Arab people's legitimate rights, particularly their right to repatriation, self-determination and the establishment of their independent state on their national soil.

Comrade al-Ahmar underlined the importance of cohesion and unity among the various progressive and nationalist forces in order to further strengthen the worldwide front which is hostile to imperialism and Zionism and to preserve the national independence of the various peoples who struggle for liberation, independence and progress.

Comrade al-Ahmar reiterated the Ba'th Party's stance on the Cypriot issue and its support for the Cypriot people and their progressive forces and for their struggle to reunite Cypriot and preserve its independence.

(Sivyanus) voiced his appreciation of Syria's steadfast stand in the face of imperialism, Zionism and reactionary. He reconfirmed his country's and people's support for the struggle of the Syrian people under the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. He wished the Syrian people further prosperity and continued progress under the leadership of militant President Hafiz al-Asad, secretary general of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and president of the republic.

CSO: 4400/276

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

NATIONAL ECONOMY PRIORITIES OUTLINED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 18, 3 May 82 pp 5-6

[Text] The Dirhams 2.3 billion (\$625 million) deficit envisaged in this year's UAE budget could rise to Dirhams 5 billion (\$1.36 billion) if the oil market does not recover, a UAE minister warned last week. According to the official *Emirates News Agency (WAM)*, Assistant Undersecretary for Finance and Industry, Ahmed al-Tayer, said that government spending plans had to be reconsidered and foreign aid should be "reprogrammed."

Earlier this month, UAE Finance Minister Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid al-Maktoum announced a 58 per cent cut in this year's foreign aid programme (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, April 12). State expenditure was reduced from last year's budgeted total of Dirhams 26.3 billion (\$7.2 billion), of which only Dirhams 20.3 billion (\$5.5 billion) was actually spent, to Dirhams 22.6 billion (\$6.2 billion) for the coming financial year.

Mr Tayer said his ministry had worked out new priorities with a view to paring expenditure to the minimum. These priorities were electricity, water, education, health and housing in addition to other important projects. The assistant undersecretary asserted that the government's contribution to the country's five-year plan would amount to Dirhams 13 billion (\$3.53 billion) by the end of 1985.

Mr Tayer suggested that now the UAE had completed building basic services over the last 10 years, it was time to introduce taxes. Last year a tax of 30 per cent was imposed on tobacco products in the first measure of its kind. But Mr Tayer promised that the government would maintain its subsidy of oil products at a cost of Dirhams 700 million (\$190 million).

In recent weeks, a number of UAE officials have spoken of the need to diversify sources of national income, not only by developing the non-oil sector of the economy, but also by imposing taxes on company profits and raising charges for services.

## **Key priorities are training and manufacturing**

Meanwhile, the UAE's Central Bank has singled out manpower training and manufacturing industry as the sectors of the national economy requiring priority attention in the present decade, it was reported in the UAE newspaper *Al-Khaleej* last week. In its annual report for 1981, the bank recommended a strategy based on highly capital-intensive industry in view of the availability of capital and the shortage of manpower. The UAE has a work-force estimated at around 540,000, of which fewer than 70,000 are citizens, in a total population of 1.04 million.

The bank report said the main emphasis should be on oil-related industry, but added that there was also room for small industrial units in the private sector which would be oriented to the domestic market and be more labour-intensive.

Inflation in the UAE had been fuelled by the rise in import prices, construction costs and rents, the report said. In the bank's view, this has led to the recognition of the need to restrain the money supply and bank credit and to exercise fiscal caution in order to combat inflation, which continued to run at a rate of about 15 per cent in 1981. This compares with a rate of about 25 per cent a year during the financially unstable period 1974-77.

The Central Bank defined the two main objectives of development in the UAE as steady real income growth in an environment of financial stability and a reduced dependence on oil through the diversification of the economy. The latter goal could be achieved through industrialisation, though there was also some scope for agricultural development. The report said that the real growth target for the future, 5 to 6 per cent a year, was about half the rate achieved in the last seven years, but pointed out that, "While the previous growth was in spurts, future growth will be more steady."

The report welcomed the creation of the Industrial Bank, which it saw as necessary "to meet certain financing requirements of private industry." But it argued that the Industrial Bank should provide managerial and technical advice in addition to lending money.

Domestic industry should be protected, especially in the early stages of industrialisation, through import duties and subsidies, the report urged. It pointed out, however, that such protection cannot and should not be given for an indefinite period, since this would lead to inefficiency and high prices.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

AL-'AYN CRIME RISE BLAMED ON ALIENS

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 12 Apr 82 p 3

[Text]

AL AIN (EN) The continuous flow of aliens into the country has been blamed for the increase in crime in Al Ain where a total of 3,339 cases were reported last year.

And a senior police official has pledged that the raids against illegal workers will continue.

Colonel Salem Al Tajar, Deputy Police chief of Al Ain said 1980 recorded an increase of 693 cases compared to 1979, when 2,455 cases were reported against 3,148 in 1980. At 3,391 in 1981, the figure was higher by 243 over that of 1980.

Illegal stay, violation of labour laws, theft, juvenile delinquency and narcotics are the main features of crime in this town, where the country's first and only university is located.

According to Col. Al Tajar, there were 1,030 cases involving juveniles last year, including 58 in which nationals were prosecuted. Juveniles were convicted for theft, narcotics offences and driving cars and motorbikes without licence.

But narcotics cases were fewer in 1981 (7) than the previous year (16 cases). The Deputy Police chief attributed the drop to the "vast efforts" made by his Narcotics Department.

Col. Al Tajar, however believes that Al Ain "has not so far, witnessed any crime that may constitute a threat to the security and stability in the state."

He said the rise in crime in the

Eastern Region is a "natural result of the continuous flow of aliens into the UAE," including a large number of illegal residents and violators of labour laws.

In a bid to contain or, hopefully, to put an end to these crimes Al Ain law enforcement agencies undertook one of the largest campaign in the history of this country.

Col. Al Tajar says the campaign began in mid-1981 at the rate of two raids each week.

It has covered shops, restaurants, companies, construction sites and labour camps.

The first of these raids involved 500 policemen, who cordoned off the so-called Pathanland outside Al Ain at about three o'clock one morning last year. A 3-hour check was made on the immigration and labour documents of the residents who mostly live in makeshift dwellings.

Police, who were accompanied by the inspectors from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, arrested 900 workers, including 200 who were entered the country illegally. Others arrested were violators of labour laws, mostly runaway employees who had deserted their original sponsors. The raid also resulted in the arrest of persons wanted by the police in connection with crimes, including murder.

Col. Al Tajar says that the campaign has never ceased since then, with surprise checking raids spreading to other townships and labour camps in the Eastern Region.

Remote agricultural areas such as Al Hair, Al Faggar, Al Shuwaib, Al Awaha and Mazied were also the scene of roundups of workers. Large numbers of company labourers, drivers, farm workers and domestics were illegally staying in these areas, Col. Al Tajar said, and about 500 such violators had been rounded up in small towns and areas in the region.

Raids continued with an average rate of 150 arrests at a time. So far a total of 1,500 aliens had been taken to courts, which ordered the deportation of some and the imprisonment of others who were later to be expelled.

"Raids are continuing day and night. We will never stop unless our country is free of those staying here illegally," the Colonel pledged.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

RESIDENCE PERMITS--Abu Dhabi, Fri.--All foreigners living in the UAE will lose the validity of their residence permits if they live outside the federation for more than six months, it was officially announced here today. A circular to that effect was passed by Director General of the Nationality and Immigration Department Col. Hilal Saeed to all concerned departments in the six federated Emirates. The circular came in response to orders from the Cabinet and will become effective from tomorrow. All passports held by foreigners in the UAE will be imprinted as follows: "The residence permit will expire automatically if its holder lived outside the country for six consecutive months." Violators of this order will not be allowed entry to the country, the circular said. Observers here said the new step is part of the government's measures to reduce dependence on expatriates who outnumber the citizens of this Gulf federation.--Kuna. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 1 May 82 p 1]

CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT--Minister of Electricity and Water Humaid Nasser Al Oweis yesterday signed in Dubai a Dh 5-million contract with a company for the implementation of various construction projects for the ministry. The projects include construction of a number of internal roads, transformer rooms and walls at various power stations in the Northern Emirates. The projects will be completed within a year. The minister also signed another contract with a company to design, install and carry out tests on fourth fuel tank at Ghalilah steam power station in Ras Al Khaimah. The contract is valued at Dh 1,385,000. The Ghalilah steam power station is expected to function at full capacity in May. Mr Saeed Al Sagheer, director of electricity in Ras Al Khaimah, said the total capacity of the station is 66 mega watt. First turbine was test-run successfully on March 25, and preparations are under way to connect it with the general distribution network and the main power station in Al Nakheel area. He said two other 50-mega watt turbines would be installed at Al Nakheel station. They will be test-run in the first week of May.--WAM. [Text] [Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 28 Apr 82 p 3]

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